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WILLIAM T.

BATSON V.

KENTUCKY:

PIZZI

CURING

THE DISEASE BUT KILLING
THE PATIENT

A. INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's efforts to make all citizens equally eligible
for jury service has a long history. In 1880 in Strauder v. West
Virginia,' the Court held unconstitutional as a violation of the defendant's right to equal protection of the laws the murder conviction
of a black defendant who had been tried by an all-white jury under
a statute that restricted eligibility for jury service to "white male
persons." In reaching its result the Court emphasized that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to prohibit "discrimination
because of race or color ' 2 and the Court asked rhetorically, "[H]ow
can it be maintained that compelling a colored man to submit to
trial for his life by a jury drawn from a panel from which the state
has expressly excluded every man of his race, because of color alone,
however well qualified in other respects, is not a denial to him of
equal legal protection?"3
William T. Pizzi is Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
AUTHOR's NOTE: I am deeply indebted to Professors Albert Alschuler and Richard Collins
for helping to improve this article by providing detailed comments on an earlier draft, and I
particularly appreciate access to Professor Alschuler's lecture notes on the case, which helped
to clarify my arguments-especially when our views differed. I also thank my colleagues
Christopher Mueller and Robert Nagel for their many helpful comments; Professor Charles
Judd of the Psychology Department of the University of Colorado, for his help in researching
the subject of ingroup bias; and John Matthew for his able research assistance.
'100 U.S. 303 (1880).
2100 U.S. at 310.

3100 U.S. at 309.
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A year after Strauder, in Neal v. Delaware,4 the Court extended
the equal protection analysis of Strauder to cover a statute that was
not discriminatory on its face, but which was administered so as
to exclude all blacks from the jury venire. In the years since Strauder
and Neal, the Court has made it clear that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits discrimination on bases other than race, such as
national origin.5 The Court has also eased significantly defendants'
difficulties in showing discrimination on the part of the state by
ruling that a defendant only need show a prima facie case of discrimination before the burden shifts to the state to prove that there
was not deliberate discrimination. 6 The result of these decisions
and modern jury selection statutes 7 has been an emphasis on making
sure that lists of those eligible for jury service are compiled in neutral
ways that help ensure that those citizens called for jury service will
come from a cross section of citizens in the community.
Over the past quarter century the battleground over jury selection
has shifted from the jury venire to the selection of the petit jury,
as defendant after defendant has complained in jurisdiction after
jurisdiction8 that the prosecution used its peremptory challenges on
a systematic basis to remove all prospective black jurors with the
result that the defendant was tried by an all-white jury. The exact
extent of the problem is not known because data on jury demographics at either the state or federal level are sparse, 9 but there is
no dispute that it is a serious problem in the criminal justice system,
4103 U.S. 370 (1881).
'See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
6
See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935). See generally 2 LaFave & Israel, Criminal
Procedure §21.2(c) (1984).
'The Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, codified 28 U.S.C. §§1861-69, aims
at ensuring that juries are "selected at random from a fair cross section of the community
in the district or division wherein the court convenes," 28 U.S.C. § 1861. The Act specifically
prohibits exclusion from service as a juror "on account of race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, or economic status." 28 U.S.C. §1862.
8

One treatise on jury selection lists lines of cases from Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana,
Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, California, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the federal courts in which all or
most blacks were excluded by prosecutorial use of peremptory challenges, Van Dyke, Jury
Selection Procedures 156 (1977), but it is doubtful if there are many jurisdictions in which
there is not such a line of cases. See also 2 Ginger, Jury Selection in Civil and Criminal
Trials §20 (2d ed. 1984).
9See Jorgenson, Back to the Laboratory with Peremptory Challenges: A Florida Response,
12 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 558, 578 n.137 (1984).
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especially when one starts with the fact that minorities are often
underrepresented on jury panels as an initial matter.' 0 The use of
peremptory challenges systematically to remove prospective black
jurors is most likely to occur when the defendant is black and the
prosecution wants to remove jurors who may be sympathetic to
the defendant, but it is not limited to such cases. As one treatise
explained:"
The prosecution is frequently looking for a juror who is middleaged, middle-class, and white, on the assumption that this type
of juror identifies with the government rather than the defendant
and will thus be more likely to convict.
This is consistent with the traditional "folklore" surrounding jury
selection which suggests that minorities are more likely to sympathize with plaintiffs in civil cases and with defendants in criminal
2

cases: '

The traditional trial-lawyer lore dictates, for instance, that in
complicated cases the young should be preferred over the old
and men over women. When a child is either the victim or the
plaintiff, women jurors are considered desirable, but when
women are parties, female jurors should be avoided because
they are hard on their own sex. The Irish, Italians, Jews, French,
Blacks, Chicanos and those of Balkan heritage are said to sympathize with plaintiffs in civil suits and defendants in criminal
actions. The English, Scandinavian, and Germans allegedly have
the opposite perspective.
The major roadblock for the past twenty years to an attack on
the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective black jurors
has been Swain v. Alabama, 3 a decision issued at the height of the
Warren Court era, where the Court refused to extend the equal
protection analysis used in the venire cases to cover the use of
peremptory challenges in the confines of a single case. 14 But in 1983
10See Van Dyke, note 8 supra, at 28. Among the reasons offered for the underrepresentation
of minorities on jury panels is the fact that they are underrepresented on voter registration
lists as an initial matter and, in addition, tend to move more frequently than whites so that
those voter registrations will often not be accurate. Id. at 30.
111d. at 152.
2Id. at 153. See also I Lane, Goldstein Trial Technique §§9.45, 9.48 (3d ed. 1984); Simon,
The Jury and the Defense of Insanity 111 (1967).
13380 U.S. 202 (1965).
"See text starting at note 17 infra.
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the Court hinted that it was preparing to reconsider the issue of
the prosecutorial use of peremptory challenges to remove blacks
from the trial jury in a trial of a black defendant,' 5 and, finally, in
1986 the Court decided Batson v. Kentucky16 and struck down on
equal protection grounds the use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors to remove blacks on the basis of race where the defendant
is also black. In doing so, the Court avoided the Sixth Amendment
ground, which is the issue on which certiorari had been granted.
I. THE DISCRIMINATORY USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES: THE
BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM
A.

SWAIN V. ALABAMA

Until Batson was decided, the landmark decision on the prosecutorial use of peremptory challenges to remove blacks from the
jury was Swain v. Alabama,17 decided in 1965. In Swain, a black

defendant, convicted of rape and sentenced to death, raised two
related challenges. First, he challenged the selection of the grand
jurors and the selection of the venire in the county in which he
was tried. In support of his argument that his right to equal protection was violated, he showed that blacks were substantially
underrepresented on grand juries and on petit jury venires.' 8 Secondly, Swain argued that his right to equal protection was violated
in the selection of petit jurors. Swain showed that no black had
served on a petit jury in his county since 1950 9 and in his particular
case, although there were eight blacks on the jury panel, no blacks
were on the petit jury that convicted him because two blacks were
exempt from service and the prosecutor had used peremptory challenges to strike the other six blacks.2 0
Concerning the underrepresentation of blacks on grand juries
and jury panels, the Court concluded that although the selection
system was "somewhat haphazard and little effort was made to

"See text at note 63 infra.
16106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986).
17380 U.S. 202 (1965).

"8d. at 205.
191d.
at 222-23.

zld. at 210.
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ensure that all groups in the community were represented,"', the
22
percentage of underrepresentation of blacks was relatively smal
and the record failed to show purposeful discrimination based on
race.
The Court also denied Swain's challenge to the prosecutor's peremptory strikes of prospective black jurors. The Court began by
reviewing the long history of peremptory challenges which the
Court traced to the Ordinance of Inquests in 1305.23 The Court
then explained that "[t]he essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without
inquiry and without being subject to the court's control ' 24 and it
"permits rejection for a real or imagined partiality that is less easily
designated or demonstrable. 25 The Court pointed out that peremptories are often exercised on the basis of a prospective juror's looks,
gestures, habits, and associations.2 6 More importantly, the Court
frankly acknowledged that peremptory challenges are often exercised "on grounds normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings
or official action, namely, the race, religion, national origin, oc'27
cupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty.
From these premises concerning the nature of the peremptory
challenge and its purpose, the Court concluded that the striking of
blacks in a single case could not amount to a denial of equal
2
protection:
In the quest for an impartial and qualified jury, Negro and
White, Protestant and Catholic, are alike subject to being challenged without cause. To subject the prosecutor's challenge in
any particular case to the demands and traditional standards of
the Equal Protection Clause would entail a radical change in
the nature and operation of the challenge.
21Id.
at 209.
22The methodology whereby Justice White concluded that the underrepresentation of
blacks in the county in which Swain was tried was relatively small has been strongly
criticized. See Brown, McGuire, and Winters, The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative
Device in Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 New Eng. L. Rev. 192, 201 (1978);
Note, 65 Yale L.J. 322, 326 (1965).
23380 U.S. at 213.
21380 U.S. at 220.

2"Ibid.
26Ibid.
27d. at 220-21.
21Id.
at 221-22.
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Any other conclusion, the Court feared, would subject the prosecutor's judgment "to scrutiny for reasonableness and sincerity."29
The Court did not close the door entirely on challenges to the
alleged misuse of peremptory challenges. It indicated that if it could
be shown that in a particular jurisdiction the prosecutors are "consistently and systematically" exercising their challenges to prevent
"any and all" blacks on jury panels from serving on petit juries,
such a systematic practice would constitute invidious discrimination
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 10 Since Swain had failed
to show under what circumstances the prosecutor in the county at
issue had been responsible for striking blacks in cases other than
his own, the Court concluded that there had been no violation of
Swain's right to equal protection. 3'
Commentators12 and courts" in the years after Swain have been
highly critical of the opinion. The Second Circuit sarcastically titled
a section of an opinion dealing with the showing required by Swain
"Mission Impossible,"3 4 and a state supreme court referred to the
burden imposed on defendants to make out an equal protection
claim after Swain as "Sisyphean. '' 15 While a number of differing

explanations have been offered to account for the failure of black
defendants to make the showing required by Swain,3 6 there is no
'9Id. at 222.

1Id. at 223-24.
"Id. at 224.
"See, e.g., Sullivan, Deterring the Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 21 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 477 (1984); Note, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1770 (1979); Brown, McQuire, and
Winters, The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials, 14 New
Eng. L. Rev. 192 (1978); Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. Cal. L. Rev.
235 (1968); Note, 39 Miss. L. J. 157 (1967): Comment, 52 Va. L. Rev. 1157 (1966). But see
Saltzburg and Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash between Impartiality and
Group Representation, 41 Md. L. Rev. 337 (1982).
13See, e.g., United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313, 1316-18 (8th Cir. 1983) (en bane),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984); McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1120 (2d Cir. 1984),
vacated, 106 S.Ct. 3289 (1986); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583
P.2d 748, 767 (1978).
4
1 McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1120.
"Commonwealth v. Soares, 471 Mass. 461, 471 n.10, 399 N.E.2d 499, 509 n.10 (1979).
"The lack of success defendants have had under Swain is frequently attributed to the fact
that an individual defendant is unlikely to have either the time or the resources to compile
and analyze the raw data necessary to mount a statistical attack on the prosecution's use of
peremptory challenges. See United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d at 1316; United States v.
Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207, 1217 (5th Cir. 1971). But with the emergence of strong and organized
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dispute that in the years since Swain, the number of successful
attacks on the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to remove blacks on a systematic basis over many cases have been almost
nonexistent. In United States v. Childress,17 decided by the Eighth
Circuit en banc in 1983, the court reported that it had found two
such cases,3 8 both from the same Louisiana parish, where a defendant had successfully established systematic exclusion of blacks.
B.

NEW DEVELOPMENTS UNDER STATE CONSITFUTIONAL LAW:
WHEELER AND SOARES

In the late 1970s, after the Supreme Court had extended the
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial to the states39 and had also
established as part of the right to an impartial jury the right of a
defendant to a jury pool that is drawn from a fair cross section of
the community, 4° two state courts, California and Massachusetts,
using state constitutional analogs to the Sixth Amendment, took a
new approach to the problem raised by the use of peremptory
challenges by the prosecutor to remove blacks from the jury.
In People v. Wheeler,41 the California Supreme Court, using article
I, section 16 of the California Constitution, 42 ruled that it was unconstitutional for a party to employ its peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors solely on the basis of group bias. The court
reversed the convictions of two black defendants in cases in which
the prosecution had used its peremptory challenges to strike every

public defender systems, the empirical difficulties of proof seem somewhat exaggerated. A
more obvious reason why defendants have been unable to show the systematic exclusion by
the prosecution of"any and all blacks" from petit juries in a given jurisdiction is that assuming
a normal mix of cases and a normal cross section of defendants and victims, it would seem
extremely unlikely that there would be many offices in which prosecutors would remove
all blacks from all juries in all cases. There will obviously be cases in which black jurors
would be very desirable from the prosecution's perspective. See Saltzburg and Powers, note
32 supra, at 353-65 (arguing that prosecutors try to keep blacks off some but not all juries).
37715 F.2d 1313, 1316 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984).
3

State v. Brown, 371 So.2d 751 (La. 1979); State v. Washington, 375 So.2d 1162 (La.

1979).
9

5 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
4OSee Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
4122 Cal. 3d 258, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 (1978).
4'Article I, section 16 of the California Constitution provides in relevant part: "Trial by
jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all...... Cal. Const., art. I, §16.
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prospective black juror.4 3 While making it clear that a defendant is
not entitled to a jury that proportionately mirrors the community
nor even to a jury that includes members of his particular ethnic
group,- the California court explained "that a party is entitled to a
petit jury that is as near an approximation of the ideal cross-section
of the community as the process of random draw permits. '45 By striking jurors on the basis of what the court referred to as "group bias,"
which the court defined to include bias against "groups distinguished
on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds," the court reasoned
that the impartiality that comes from "allowing the interaction of the
diverse beliefs and values the jurors bring from their group
experiences" would be destroyed. The result of peremptories based
on group bias, the court feared, would be a jury "dominated by the
47
conscious or unconscious prejudices of the majority."
Under the procedure set up in Wheeler, if a party believes that
the other side is using peremptory challenges to strike jurors on
the ground of "group bias alone," the party must raise the issue and
make a prima facie case of discrimination to the satisfaction of the
court. 4 If the court finds a reasonable likelihood that peremptory

challenges were used on the ground of group bias alone, the burden
shifts to the challenging party to show that the peremptory challenges were not predicated on group bias alone, but were instead
based on the "specific bias" of the prospective jurors which the
court defined to include "bias concerning the particular case on trial
or the parties or witnesses thereto.

49

The reasoning of People v. Wheeler was relied on heavily by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Soares.1o
4

1The court stated that because members of the venire are not required to indicate their
race, religion, or ethnic origin, it was unclear exactly how many blacks had been struck by
the prosecution. 583 P.2d at 752.
44Id. at 762.
45lbid.
-1d.at 761. In another passage in the opinion, the court seemed to suggest that group bias
might extend even to groups based on sex, age, education, economic condition, place of residence, and political affiliation. Id. at 755.
47
1d. at 761.
48
1d. at 764.
1d. at 764-65.
50377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
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Soares involved a first-degree murder prosecution brought against
three black defendants who had scuffled in the early morning hours
on the streets of Boston's "Combat Zone" with several members of
the Harvard football team-athletes who, after the conclusion of a
team banquet, had gone to explore life in and around the topless
bars of Boston. During the scuffle, someone had stabbed one of
the students, who later died from his wounds. Prior to the trial of
the three defendants, the prosecution had used its peremptory challenges to remove twelve of the thirteen blacks on the venire.5 '
The Soares court interpreted article 12 of the Massachusetts Constitution, which states in part that no citizen shall be "deprived of
his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the
law of the land," to provide a right to " 'a petit jury that is as near
an approximation of the ideal cross-section of the community as
the process of random selection permits.' "52 This right, the court
ruled, is violated when peremptory challenges are used to strike
prospective jurors solely on the base of group membership or affiliation, which the court defined to include: sex, race, color, creed,
or national origin." Although there is a "presumption of proper
use" of peremptory challenges, if there is a "pattern of conduct"
whereby members of a cognizable group have been excluded and
there is "a likelihood they are being excluded from the jury solely
by reason of their group membership," then the burden shifts to
the offending party to demonstrate that the strikes were not exercised on the basis of group affiliation.5 4 While the court indicated
that the party's explanation "need not approximate the grounds
required by a challenge for cause," the reason for the challenge
''must pertain to the individual qualities of the prospective juror
55
and not to that juror's group association."
Wheeler and Soares had at best a mixed reaction in other states,
and most states refused to go down the path presented by the

"The thirteenth black juror remained on the petit jury and was later appointed the jury's
foreman by the trial judge. 387 N.E.2d at 508.
52d. at 516, quoting from People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 762.
"The court used as its source for determining which groups may not be excluded solely on
the basis of group affiliation the Equal Rights Amendment of the Massachusetts Constitution.
387 N.E.2d at 516.
541d. at 517.
"Ibid.
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decisions.5 6 In a dissenting opinion in 1983, Justice Marshall observed that in the five years following Wheeler and Soares, no other
state supreme court had imposed state constitutional limits on peremptory challenges; but in the same period nineteen states had
indicated they would continue to follow Swain.57 But in the threeyear period between 1983 and the Court's decision in Batson, three
other states used their state constitutions to reach results similar to
5
those in Wheeler and Soares. 8

C.

PEREMPTORIES UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

In 1984 Michael McCray, a black who had been convicted of
robbery in the New York courts, filed a petition for certiorari in
the United States Supreme Court.5 9 At McCray's first trial a jury

of three blacks and nine whites had hung with either two or all
three of the black jury members voting for acquittal. 60 At McCray's
retrial, at which he was convicted, the prosecution used eleven or
twelve of the state's fifteen peremptory challenges to exclude all
blacks and Hispanics from the jury. 6' The state courts had affirmed
6
the conviction on the authority of Swain. 1

6See, e.g., Flowers v. State, 402 So.2d 1088, 1093 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981); Beed v. State,
271 Ark. 526, 530, 609 S.W.2d 898, 903 (1980); Doepel v. United States, 434 A.2d 449,
457-59 (D.C.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1037 (1981); Blackwell v. State, 248 Ga. 138, 281
S.E.2d 599, 599-600 (1981); People v. Davis, 95 Ill.2d 1, 69 Il. Dec. 136, 447 N.E.2d 353
(1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 1001; State v. Stewart, 225 Kan. 410, 591 P.2d 166 (1979);
Gaines v. State, 404 So.2d 557 (Miss. 1981); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 497 Pa. 23, 438
A.2d 951 (1981); State v. Ucero, 450 A.2d 809, 812-13 (R.I. 1982); State v. Thompson, 276
S.C. 616, 281 S.E.2d 216 (1981); People v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441,
443 N.E.2d 915 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961 (1983); Drew v. State, 588 S.W.2d 562
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1979); State v. Grady, 93 Wisc.2d 1, 10-11, 286 N.W.2d 607, 611 (App.
1979); State v. Lynch, 300 N.C. 534, 268 S.E.2d 161 (1980).
"See Gilliard v. Mississippi, 464 U.S. 867 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
"See Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997 (Del. 1985); State v. Gilmore, 199 N.J. Super. 389,
489 A.2d 1175 (1985), affirmed 511 A.2d 1150 (N.J. 1986); State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481,
486 (Fla. 1984). New Mexico had also indicated in 1980 in dicta that it was leaning toward
following Wheeler. See State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (App. 1980). Since the
Court's decision in Batson, two other states have followed the approach to peremptory
challenges pioneered in Wheeler. See text at notes 294-97 infra.
I"McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961 (1983) (denial of certiorari).
6
OMcCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1115 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 106 S.Ct. 3289 (1986).
6t

lbid.

62

See People v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441, 443 N.E.2d 915 (1982), cert.

denied, 461 U.S. 961 (1983).
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The Supreme Court denied certiorari, 63 but at the same time the
Court hinted that it was interested in reconsidering Swain. In an
opinion joined by Justices Blackmun and Powell, Justice Stevens
explained that the denial of certiorari was intended to enable the
state courts to serve as laboratories for further study which would
"enable the Court to deal with the issue more wisely at a later date.
. .

-!' Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, filed an opinion

dissenting from the denial of certiorari in which he argued that it
was time to reconsider Swain in light of intervening developments
65
extending the protections of the Sixth Amendment to the states.
The two opinions revealed that at least five justices were concerned
about the use of peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors
on the basis of race.
When McCray reached the federal district court on habeas corpus,
that court took the hint and ruled that the action of the prosecutor
in using peremptory challenges to strike black jurors violated both
the cross-sectional requirements of the Sixth Amendment and the
Equal Protection Clause. 66 On appeal, the Second Circuit reluctantly reversed on the equal protection ground, but affirmed on the
Sixth Amendment ruling. 67 The court reasoned that since the Sixth
Amendment guaranteed a venire that represents a fair cross section
of the community,68
[I]t must logically be because it is important that the defendant
have the chance that the petit jury will be similarly constituted.
The necessary implication is that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the defendant that possibility. It guarantees not that the
possibility will ripen into actuality, but only the fair and undistorted chance that it will.
The result with respect to the use of peremptory challenges is
that "the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of trial by an impartial jury
allows the prosecution to exercise its peremptory challenges to excuse jurors to whom, on the basis of their personal history or
behavior, some bias may be imputed; but it forbids the exercise of
63

See McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961 (1983).

4Id. at 962.
6
7d. at 969.
6See McCray v. Abrams, 576 F.Supp. 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
67See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113.
68750 F.2d at 1128-29.
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such challenges to excuse jurors solely on the basis of their racial
affiliation.

69

Under the procedure set out in McCray, a defendant must first
establish a prima facie violation of his "right to the possibility of a
fair cross section" by showing that in his case (1) the group alleged
to be excluded is a cognizable group in the community, and (2)
there is a substantial likelihood that the challenges leading to exclusion have been made "on the basis of the individual venirepersons' group affiliation rather than because of any indication of a
possible inability to decide the case on the basis of the evidence
presented. '70 If the defendant makes such a showing, then the bur-

den shifts to the prosecutor to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action by showing that "permissible racially neutral selec7
tion criteria" supported the peremptory challenge. 1
The issue was joined when, after certiorari had been granted in
Batson'7 2 the Fifth Circuit issued an en banc opinion, United States
v. Leslie, 73 that challenged the reasoning and the conclusion reached
74
in McCray.
Leslie, a prominent fight promoter in the city of New Orleans,
was charged with distributing cocaine. 75 During the voir dire the
government used its six peremptory challenges to remove six blacksthe only six blacks on the twenty-eight-person panel left after challenges for cause.76 The defense had challenged ten white jurors with
its ten peremptories. 77 The government had also struck the only
black on the four-person alternate pool, while the defense had used
69750 F.2d at 1131.
70750 F.2d at 1131-32.
71750 F.2d at 1132. The court stated further that the prosecutor's rebuttal need not rise

to the level of a challenge for cause because "there are any number of bases on which a party
may believe, not unreasonably, that a prospective juror may have some slight bias that would
not support a challenge for cause but that would make excusing him or her desirable." Ibid.
72471 U.S. 1052 (1985).
71783 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1986), vacated, 107 S.Ct. 1267 (1987).
74

In Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated sub nom. Michigan v. Booker,
106 S.Ct. 3289 (1986), the Sixth Circuit had adopted the reasoning in McCray in ruling that
the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective black jurors at the trial
of a black defendant violated the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury.
11783 F.2d at 543.
1bid.

76

771bid.
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its peremptory with respect to alternates to strike one of the three
7
whites in the alternate pool.
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by arguing that challenges
on the basis of race or religion or any other characteristic common
to a "cognizable group" were proper as long as the prosecutor acted
on the basis of considerations going to the particular case being
tried, such as the nature of the crime and the background of the
particular defendant. The Fifth Circuit saw this as the teaching of
Swain. It thus drew a sharp distinction between peremptory challenges exercised for adversary advantage and the complete exclusion
of cognizable groups from jury service condemned by the Court in
79
the venire cases:
To be peremptorily challenged by one side or the other ...
bespeaks a judgment which is neither societal nor even normative, but merely reflects the tactical determination of one
contesting litigant's counsel that the challenged person is, under
the discrete facts of that particular case, more likely than not
to favor the other side.
The court rejected the Sixth Amendment approach pioneered by
the Second Circuit and concluded that systematic peremptory challenges of a cognizable group of citizens are not a violation of the
right to the "possibility of a cross section of the community" on
the jury. It reasoned that although the jury system does embrace
"ccross-sectional values," such values are embraced in the context
of, and are limited by, the overall concept of trial by jury which
includes the right to challenge jurors for both individual and group
0 The court also refused to bar the use of peremptory
characteristics. 8
challenges by the prosecution on the basis of group affiliation under
its supervisory power.8 '
II.
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Three years after the Court hinted that it was preparing to

reconsider the issue of the prosecutorial use of peremptory chal78 Ibid.

"9783 F.2d at 554.
11Id. at 556.
"Id. at 566.
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lenges to strike prospective jurors on the basis of race, 2 the Court
decided Batson v. Kentucky. 83 Batson was a black defendant charged
with second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. In Batson's
case, the prosecutor used four of his six peremptory challenges14 to

remove all four prospective black jurors from the jury list. Batson
was tried and convicted by an all-white jury.8
Following his conviction on both counts, Batson appealed to the
Supreme Court of Kentucky. Conceding that Swain foreclosed an
equal protection attack on his conviction, Batson argued that the
prosecutor's act of striking the blacks from his jury violated his
right to a jury drawn from a cross section of the community under
the Sixth Amendment and its analog in the Kentucky Constitution.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the conviction in a oneparagraph opinion which relied on Swain.6 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari on the Sixth Amendment issue.
But the Court had a major surprise in store. Its opinion in Batson
turned not on the Sixth Amendment issue, but instead on the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Not surprisingly,
this development produced some background skirmishing in the
opinions over the propriety of the Court's resolving an important
issue of criminal procedure on a theory other than that on which
certiorari had been granted .87
A.

THE OPINIONS IN BATSON

Writing for the seven-person majority, Justice Powell argued that
the protection afforded an accused under the Equal Protection Clause
does not stop with the exclusion of cognizable racial groups from
2

See text at notes 63-65 supra.
83106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986).

1In noncapital felony cases in Kentucky the prosecution is entitled to five peremptory
challenges and the defense is entitled to eight challenges, but where there is an alternate to
be chosen, as was the case in Batson's trial, 106 S.Ct. at 1715 n.2, each side receives an
additional peremptory challenge. Ky. R. Crim. P., Rule 9.40.
81106 S.Ct. at 1715.
"~Id. at 1715-16.

"In his dissenting opinion, ChiefJustice Burger criticized the majority for departing from
normal procedures in order to decide the case on an issue that had not briefed and argued.
See 106 S.Ct. 1731, 1731-32. Justice Stevens responded to this criticism in a concurring
opinion in which he argued that the issue was properly before the Court because several
amicicuiae, including the Solicitor General in his brief, had raised the issue. See id. at 1729.
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the jury venire, but rather "the Fourteenth Amendment protects
'88
an accused throughout the proceedings bringing him to justice.
Thus "the State's privilege to strike individual jurors through peremptory challenges, is subject to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause,"8' 9 and equal protection "forbids a prosecutor from
challenging potential jurors solely on account of their race or on
the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant." 90
Although the majority argued that its decision was a logical extension of Strauder and the Court's historical condemnation of discrimination on the basis of race, the majority seemed a bit uncertain
about what to do with Swain. The opinion noted that, despite the
denial of relief to the defendant in that case, the Swain opinion did
indicate that the Equal Protection Clause placed some limits on
peremptory challenges in certain cases. 91
The problem with Swain, for the majority, was the "interpretation 92
of that case so as to place on defendants a "crippling burden of proof" 91
by making a defendant show systematic exclusion of blacks over a
number of cases in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. It was this "evidentiary formulation" 94 which the majority
claimed to reject in Batson, because those standards are "inconsistent
with standards that have been developed since Swain for assessing a
prima facie case under the Equal Protection Clause."95
The standards "developed since Swain" to which the Court referred had been developed for assessing equal protection challenges
to jury venires. The Court in Batson took the procedures developed
in venire cases for evaluating claims of racial discrimination on the
part of the state and applied them to the petit jury. As in the venire
cases, the defendant must show initially a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by the prosecutor in the exercise of the state's
peremptory challenges. 96 To establish such a case the defendant
88ld. at 1718.
91bid.
9Id. at 1719.
91id. at 1720.

"Ibid.
Ibid.
94 d.at 1721.
91Ibid.
9Id. at 1722.
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must show (1) that he is a member of a cognizable racial group and
(2) that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race. 97 In making
the requisite showing, the defendant must show facts and circumstances that raise an inference that the prosecutor used peremptory
challenges to exclude prospective jurors on account of race. Among
the relevant facts which the Court indicated might give rise to an
inference of discrimination was a " 'pattern' of strikes against black
jurors" or similarly "the prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire."98
Just as with equal protection challenges to the composition of a
jury venire, once the defendant has succeeded in raising a prima
facie case of discrimination, "the burden shifts to the State to come
forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors."
Such an explanation, the Court emphasized, "need not rise to the
level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause,"' ° but "the pros-

ecutor may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case of discrimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant's
race on the assumption-or his intuitive judgment-that they would
be partial to the defendant because of their shared race."''
The Court left to the lower courts the task of working out the
procedures to be followed if the prosecutor does not rebut the
defendant's prima facie case-whether, for example, to start the
jury selection process over with a new panel' 0 2 or to require the
reinstatement of improperly challenged jurors. 03 It reasoned that
given the variety of jury selection practices followed in state and
federal trial courts, it was better not "to attempt to instruct those
courts how best to implement our holding today."' 4
Because Batson had made a timely objection to the prosecutor's
use of peremptory challenges, the case was remanded to permit the
9

1d. at 1723.

"Ibid.
99Ibid.

1OIbid.
"'1Ibid.
"02See, e.g., McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d at 1132; Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 773; People

v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 765.
"'See United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467, 474 (Conn. 1976), mandamus granted
sub nom. United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
"'1106 S.Ct. at 1724 n.24.
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trial court to determine whether the facts had raised a prima facie
case of discrimination, and if so, to permit the prosecutor an op10 5
portunity to offer a neutral explanation for his actions.
There were four concurring opinions, but two were not directed
to the merits of the majority opinion. Justice Stevens's concurring
opinion was directed solely to the propriety of the Court's finding a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause when the petitioner had not
raised that issue in the request for certiorari. 0 6 Justice O'Connor
added a one-paragraph opinion 0 7 to express agreement with the conclusion of Justice White in his concurrence' 8 and of Chief Justice
Burger in his dissent'09 that the decision in Batson should not be applied retroactively." 0 Justice White was more candid in his concurring opinion than was the majority. He acknowledged at the start of
his opinion that the Court was overruling the "principal holding" of
Swain v. Alabama, which had traditionally shielded a prosecutor's use
of peremptory challenges in a particular case from inquiry into the
reasons for the exercise of those challenges. " But he explained that
prosecutors had not heeded the warning implicit in Swain "that using
peremptories to exclude blacks on the assumption that no black juror
could fairly judge a black defendant would violate the Equal Protection Clause."' 2 Thus he concluded that because "the practice of
peremptorily eliminating blacks from petit juries in cases with black
defendants remains widespread,. . . an opportunity to inquire should
be afforded when this occurs.""' If the issue is properly raised by
the defendant and the judge "is not persuaded otherwise, the judge
may conclude that the challenges rest on the belief that blacks could
4
not fairly try a black defendant.""
15Id. at 1725.
16Id. at 1729. See note 87 supra.
1"'106 S.Ct. at 1731.
'03M. at 1726.
'9Id. at 1741.
1'The Court has subsequently ruled that Batson is to be applied retroactively to all cases,
federal and state, pending on direct review and not yet final, Griffith v. Kentucky, 107 S.Ct.
708 (1987), but Batson is not to be applied retroactively on collateral review to cases that had
become final before Batson was handed down, Allen v. Hardy, 106 S.Ct. 2878 (1986).
"'106 S.Ct. at 1725.
11lbid.
"'Ibid.
4
Mbid.
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Justice Marshall wrote a concurring opinion in which he welcomed the Court's conclusion that use of peremptory challenges to
remove blacks from juries violates the Equal Protection Clause, but
he questioned the adequacy of the Court's remedy.- His analysis
of cases in California' 1 6 and Massachusetts"1 7 following the decisions

in Wheeler and Soares suggested to him that only in a particularly
flagrant cage will a defendant be able to establish a prima facie case
so as to require judicial inquiry into the prosecutor's motives. The
result was that "[p]rosecutors are left free to discriminate against
blacks in jury selection provided that they hold discrimination to
an 'acceptable' level."'' 8
Moreover, he argued, even where a prima facie case is found, it
will be extremely difficult for a trial judge to second-guess facially
neutral reasons for the exclusions-reasons that an unscrupulous
prosecutor could always supply. 19 And he worried that, even putting the issue of dishonesty aside, "conscious or unconscious racism"
may cause a prosecutor to view a prospective black juror as "sullen"
or "distant," and the same source could cause the judge to accept
that explanation as well supported. 20
Since it has often been declared that peremptory challenges are
not constitutionally required, Justice Marshall concluded that the
best solution would be for the Court to ban the use of peremptory
challenges by prosecutors and allow states to eliminate the defendant's peremptory challenges, since "[t]he potential for racial prejudice ... inheres in the defendant's challenge as well."' 2'

11Id. at 1726.

" 6From California, Justice Marshall cited People v. Rousseau, 129 Cal. App.3d 526, 53637, 179 Cal. Rptr. 892, 897-98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982), where no prima facie case was found

even though the prosecutor had peremptorily struck the only two blacks on the jury panel.
106 S.Ct. at 1727-28.
"'From Massachusetts, Justice Marshall cited Commonwealth v. Robinson, 382 Mass.
189, 195, 415 N.E.2d 805, 809-10 (1981) where, in a case involving a black defendant, the
prosecutor had used one challenge for cause and three peremptory challenges to remove
three blacks and a Puerto Rican with the result that the jury that convicted the defendant
was all-white. 106 S.Ct. at 1727.
"1Id. at 1728.
19Ibid
"I2Obid.
"'Id. at 1729.
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Both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist filed dissents.
On the merits,' 22 Chief Justice Burger expressed agreement with
Strauder and the long line of cases that have found exclusion of
cognizable groups from jury venires to be a violation of equal protection, but, relying heavily on United States v. Leslie, he maintained
that the decisions of the litigants in a particular case to strike prospective jurors stands on a different footing. Peremptory challenges,
he explained, are exercised on limited information about the prospective jurors. They are "peremptory" precisely because they are
often made on the basis of assumptions and hunches about people
and how they might act as jurors in a particular case. 2 1 Quoting
Swain, Burger explained that peremptories "are often lodged, of
necessity, for reasons 'normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race, religion, nationality,
occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty.' 124
Instead of being a logical extension of equal protection principles,
Burger argued that the majority in Batson was in fact departing from
"conventional equal protection principles."'' 21 In the first place, he
maintained, the majority's careful attempt to limit the holding of
the case to cognizable racial groups was inconsistent with settled
equal protection law which required any such application of equal
protection to extend beyond racial groups to embrace exclusions
from a petit jury on the basis of sex, religious or political affiliation,
mental capacity, number of children, living arrangements, and employment in a particular industry or profession, and so on. 126 In
addition, he argued that the Court departed from settled equal
protection principles by failing to determine the level of scrutiny
to which the state's use of peremptories was subject and then weighing the unrestrained use of peremptories against that test.'2 7 He
expressed his opinion that, given the long history of peremptory

"2'The Chief Justice initially argued that it was not proper for the Court to resolve this
case on an issue that was not raised by the petitioner. Id. at 1731, 1731-34 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). See note 87 supra.
"'106 S.Ct. at 1737.
"4 d. at 1737, quoting from Swain, 380 U.S. at 220.
1'106 S.Ct. at 1737.
126d. at 1737.
'2Id. at 1738.
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challenges, which he claimed have been in existence almost as long
as the concept of trial by jury,' 28 and the Court's own statement
nearly a hundred years ago that the peremptory challenge is " 'essential to the fairness of trial by jury,' 129 it may well be that under
conventional equal protection analysis, "a state interest of this magnitude and ancient lineage" might well overcome any equal protection objection to the state's unrestrained use of peremptories. 30
1
Finally, Burger was highly critical of the majority for giving trial
judges a difficult task for which the Court had given them no clear
guidelines. He stated, for example, that he was "at a loss to discern
the governing principles" that will satisfy the Court's requirement
that a prosecutor provide a "neutral explanation" for his challenges,
but that such explanation, although it is to be "clear and reasonably
specific," "need not rise to the level justifying a challenge for cause."' 3 '
And he concluded that the result of the majority opinion would
simply be the interjection of racial matters into the jury selection
process as prosecutors and defense attorneys build records to chal32
lenge or support the exercise of their peremptories.'
Justice Rehnquist argued in his dissent that the majority was
doing much more than simply adjusting the "evidentiary burden"
on defendants under Swain. 33 He objected that the majority was
overruling Swain, an opinion in which, he pointed out, even the
dissenters had viewed the use of race and other group affiliations
as a necessary and constitutional means for sorting out potential
juror partiality. 3 4 Justice Rehnquist concluded that as long as the
State is treating all defendants the same way-striking Asian jurors
when the defendant is Asian, white jurors when the defendant is
white, and Hispanic jurors when the defendant is Hispanic-the
use of such "crudely stereotypical" strikes "may in many cases be
hopelessly mistaken" but does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause. 3 '

"'Id. at 1734-35.
"'Id. at 1738, quoting from Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892).
13"Id. at 1738.
"Id. at 1739.
1'Id. at 1740.

"'Id. at 1742, 1744.
141d. at 1744. See note 230 infra.
"'Id. at 1744-45.
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EQUAL PROTECTION VERSUS THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

The decision to decide Batson on equal protection rather than
Sixth Amendment grounds was a surprise because the Sixth
Amendment approach to the problem of discriminatory challenges
would have offered the Court several advantages. In the first place,
under the approach pioneered in Wheeler and Soares, which views
the systematic striking of members of a racial, religious, or ethnic
group as violative of the right of a defendant to an impartial jury,
any defendant-regardless of the defendant's own racial, ethnic, or
religious identity-can challenge the systematic use of peremptory
challenges to remove jurors on the basis of race, ethnic origin, or
religion. This speaks more completely to the problem the Court
was facing, because systematic striking of members of minority
groups is not limited to situations where the defendant is also a
member of that group.' 3 6 Moreover, the Sixth Amendment approach seems more consistent with the rationale of Batson, which
turned on the effects of exclusion on those jurors being removed,
rather than the effects of exclusion on the defendant's trial. The
Court in Batson emphasized that "a defendant has no right to a
'petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own
race.'

"I"3

Instead it is the exclusion of jurors from participation in

the process that was the Court's concern."38
A second advantage of the Sixth Amendment approach to the
problem of discriminatory peremptory challenges is that it more
easily allows courts to take a balanced approach to peremptory
challenges. A serious distinction between the selection of the venire
and the selection of the petit jury is that peremptory challenges are
part of the adversary process and, in the battle for a favorable jury,
it is sometimes the defendant who is interested in using peremptory
challenges to remove jurors on the basis of their race, religion, or
ethnic origin. Perhaps recognizing that their opinions were in effect
legislating important changes in the rules governing peremptory
challenges and thus that a balanced approach to the problems raised
by peremptory challenge was important, both Wheeler and Soares
made their rulings applicable to both the prosecution and the de-

"3See text at notes 11-12 supra. See also note 190 infra.
137106 S.Ct. at 1716, quoting from Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1880).
13106 S.Ct. at 1724.
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fense. While the right to an impartial jury is a right guaranteed to
defendants, those courts reasoned that it would be inconsistent if
a court were to enforce the right to an impartial jury and the
possibility of a fair cross section against the state and at the same
time permit the defendant to use peremptory challenges to deprive
the state of the same possibility. The California Supreme Court
explained: 3 9
[T]o hold to the contrary would frustrate other essential functions served by the requirement of cross-sectionalism. For example, when a white defendant is charged with a crime against
a black victim, the black community as a whole has a legitimate
interest in participating in the trial proceedings; that interest
will be defeated if the prosecutor does not have the power to
thwart any defense attempt to strike all blacks from the jury on
the ground of group bias alone.
In Batson, the Court left for another day the issue of discriminatory peremptory challenges on the part of the defense, stating
simply in a footnote, "We express no views on whether the Constitution imposes any limit on the exercise of peremptory challenges
by defense counsel."' If the Court intends to use the Equal Protection Clause to reach defense challenges, it must confront a state
action problem. As one commentator explained, in suggesting that
the Court ought not to restrict defense peremptory challenges, "the
defendant is not a state actor."'4 This oversimplifies the matter
because state action under Shelley v. Kraemer142 seems to have a fairly
broad sweep when a private party acts in concert with government
officials. 143 It is certainly arguable that the use of peremptory challenges-provided by state rules of procedure and exercised in a
state court by "officers of the court" under judicial sanction-would
give the Court ample room to conclude that the exercise of such
challenges, even by the defense, amounts to state action, 1 but the
issue is not beyond doubt.
'3583 P.2d at 765 n.29.
'1106 S.Ct. at 1718 n.12.
'4'See Note, 92 Harv. L. Rev., note 32 supra, at 1786.
142334 U.S. 1 (1948).

141See Lugar v. Edmundson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
'4In Lugar, ibid., the Court set forth a two-part test for determining if deprivation of a
federal right may fairly be attributable to the state, 457 U.S. at 932, and this test would
seem to be met when a private defense attorney systematically strikes prospective jurors on
the basis of race under state rules of procedure which are enforced by the trial judge.
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But even if the state action objection can be met, the Court would
need to modify the approach it took in Batson if it were to extend
its equal protection ruling to defense challenges. Since the state is
not a member of a "cognizable racial group," the initial step in the
Batson analysis would have to be modified or abandoned. Perhaps
the state could be permitted to raise equal protection concerns on
behalf of prospective jurors who lack standing to vindicate their
own rights.
The state action problem raises another major contrast between
the Sixth Amendment and the equal protection approaches and a
third reason why the Sixth Amendment approach might have seemed
a more attractive alternative for controlling discriminatory peremptory challenges. The Sixth Amendment is limited to criminal
prosecutions, and thus the Court would be able to limit the impact
of its decision to the main area of concern: criminal cases. Having
chosen to regulate peremptory challenges under the Equal Protection Clause, Batson seems to have obvious implications for any case
in which an attorney for the state strikes jurors on the basis of race.
Thus, for example, in a civil rights suit against the government in
which racial discrimination is alleged, Batson and its restrictions on
peremptory challenges would seem fully applicable to the exercise
of peremptory challenges by the state.1 4 1 And, if the exercise of
peremptory challenges by private defense counsel in a criminal case
amounts to state action, presumably private attorneys representing
private parties in civil cases are subject to constitutional limitations
as well.
But although there are a number of reasons that seem to suggest
the Sixth Amendment might have provided a better route than the
Equal Protection Clause for controlling discriminatory peremptory
challenges, there is a major drawback to the Sixth Amendment
approach that must have persuaded the Court to use the Equal
Protection Clause to control discriminatory peremptory challenges.
The fair cross-section approach is based on a myth; the reality is
that neither our system of jury selection nor the remedy imposed
in Wheeler and Soares is designed to assure defendants a demographically representative cross section on the jury.

'"sIn King v. County of Nassau, 581 F.Supp. 493 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), a race discrimination
case decided prior to Batson, the court held peremptory challenges on the basis of race by
the attorney for a public college to be proper under Swain. This result would presumably
be different after Batson.
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In the first place, any realistic possibility of obtaining a fair cross
section of citizens on the petit jury is incompatible with a system
of peremptory challenges where the total number of peremptory
challenges the parties are allowed to exercise is, as in Kentucky, in
excess of the number of petit jurors to be seated, and where there
exist almost no constraints on the exercise of such challenges. -4As
Professor Jon Van Dyke, the author of the leading treatise in the
field, explained: 147
...if we are committed to a completely representative jury, it
is anomolous to allow either side to eliminate a juror thought
to be unfriendly to its position. The use of peremptory challenges inevitably makes the jury more homogeneous than the
population at large-because each side is eliminating the person
who are suspected of holding extreme positions on the other
side-and to that extent the jury becomes less representative.
48
This observation led the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Leslie1
to observe that if a fair cross section were really central to the
proper function of the jury, "we would take steps" to more nearly
ensure that the composition of each jury mirrors that of the community. 49 Instead, the decisions in the area of peremptory challenges have always emphasized that no defendant is entitled to a
jury that proportionately reflects his community,1° nor is any defendant entitled to have even a single juror of his own background
5
or race on the jury.' '

Wheeler' 52 and Soares'I recognize this and instead fall back on the
argument that the systematic use of peremptory challenges deprives
the defendant, not of his right to a fair cross section of jurors, but
rather of his right to " 'as near an approximation of the ideal cross-

'46See Van Dyke, note 8 supra, at 162.
47
'I 1d. at 168.
148See text starting at note 73 supra.
141783 F.2d at 555.
"50 See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 538; Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 413
(1972). The reason that a cross section has never been required is not the administrative
nightmare of a cross-section requirement, but rather the divisive implication that such a
concept implies: that without such a system jurors would be unable to be impartial. See
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 n.8 (1976).
'51See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305.
"51583 P.2d at 762.
15387 N.E.2d at 513.
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section of the community as the process of random draw permits.' 154 This argument has a labored quality to it, but "approximation of the ideal cross-section of the community" is not really
the concern of the courts in Wheeler and Soares. It is no defense
under those cases to a claimed misuse of peremptories that the actual
jury reflected a cross section of the community.'5 5 More importantly,
even after those decisions, prosecutors or defense attorneys may
systematically strike important segments of the community-all
college-educated jurors, all union members, all veterans, all Democrats, perhaps even all young people' 5 6-- as long as they do not
systematically strike jurors on the basis of sex, race, color, creed,
or national origin in Massachusetts 157 or on the basis of race, religion, ethnic origin, or "other similar groups" in California.158 It is
59
suspect classification that is the real heart of Wheeler and Soares.'
Recognition of this fact led one California judge to suggest that it
might be better "to recognize cross sectional analysis for what it
is-vicarious assertion of an equal protection challenge."' 60 And
commentators on Wheeler and Soares have reached the same conclusion: that it is a concern with values protected by the Equal Pro6
tection Clause that drives those cases. ' '
The Court's decision to steer clear of the Sixth Amendment and
the fair cross-section theory was no doubt heavily influenced by
the fact that, at the time that Batson was under consideration, it
was also wrestling with Lockhart v. McCree,162 which was handed
down five days after the decision in Batson. McCree had been charged
154387 N.E.2d at 516, quoting from Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 762.
"'SSee Note, 92 Harv. L. Rev., note 32 supra, at 1786.
"6The exact scope of Wheeler is unclear. While the court did not specifically include age
or political affiliation in its list of cognizable groups, 583 P.2d at 761, it left the door open
to a further expansion of the bases which would allow attacks on group-based peremptory
challenges, 583 P.2d at 755.
157387 N.E.2d at 516.
'58583 P.2d at 755.
"'9Although McCray v. Abrams was decided on Sixth Amendment grounds, it was the
court's concern over the use of racial stereotypes in jury selection that was the main factor,
suggesting that equal protection concerns are the heart of the case. 750 F.2d at 1121-22.
See Note, 85 Col. L. Rev. 1357, 1373-74 (1985).
"nPeople v. Smith, 186 Cal. Rptr. 650, 664 n.24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
"'See Note, 85 Col. L. Rev., note 159 supra, at 1374-77; Note, 92 Harv. L. Rev., note
32 supra, at 1785-89.
62106 S.Ct. 1758 (1986).
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with capital felony murder in Arkansas and had been convicted,
although the jury had rejected the state's request for the death
penalty.163 McCree had argued in his habeas corpus petition that
the process of "death qualifying" a jury in capital cases produced
juries that were more prone to convict and thus violated the fair
cross-section requirements of the Sixth Amendment. In support of
his position, McCree's attorneys had introduced into evidence fifteen social science studies which they claimed supported the conclusion that death qualification had the effect of making the jury
more inclined to convict. 64
Although the Court began its opinion by expressing "serious
doubts about the value of these studies in predicting the behavior
of actual jurors,' ' '65 the Court concluded that, even assuming their

validity, it was "convinced that an extension of the fair cross-section
requirement to petit juries would be unworkable and unsound."',
The Court rejected the notion that an impartial jury must be constructed by assembling a balance of viewpoints and dispositions
and stuck to the much more limited view "that an impartial jury
consists of nothing more that 'jurors who will conscientiously apply
the law and find the facts.' "167
The Court's handling of Batson and the Court's rejection of the
fair cross-section theory in Lockhart v. McCree seem to suggest that
the Sixth Amendment does not any longer provide an alternative
approach for attacking racially based peremptory challenges. The
Court will certainly have opportunities to resolve that question in
the future as the Second Circuit recently reaffirmed the Sixth
Amendment approach it pioneered in McCray v. Abrams, concluding
6
that nothing in Batson or McCree casts doubt on its earlier opinion,' 1
69
and the Sixth Circuit has reached a similar conclusion.'

6

1 11d. at 1761.
1d. at 1762-63.
16'Id. at 1763.
"'Id. at 1765.
7

1 1d. at 1767, quoting from Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985).
"6'See Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214 (2d. Cir. 1987).
16'See Booker v. Jabe, 801 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1986).
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BATSON AND PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES: PROBLEMS IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE

A. THE WAY PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES WORK

The Court's heavy reliance in Batson on the long line of venire
cases, starting with Strauder in 1880, that have attempted to make
all citizens eligible for jury service seems at first glance appropriate.
The notion that people are being struck from a jury on the basis
of race is offensive, and the frequent result of such challengestrial of a black defendant by an all-white jury-seems to conflict
with a system that strives to be race neutral in the way it treats
defendants and other citizens. Moreover, if the state cannot constitutionally prevent citizens of a certain race from serving on a jury
by discriminating against those citizens on the basis of race in the
selection of the venire, it seems only logical that the state should
not be permitted to use its peremptory challenges during voir dire
to achieve the same result. The constitutional victories over the
exclusion of black citizens from the venire seem to be rather hollow,
if the prosecutor, armed with several peremptories, can achieve the
same result by systematically excluding jurors on the basis of race.
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, argued that there is "simply nothing 'unequal' " in a system that permits the state to strike black
jurors on the basis of race where there is a black defendant, as long
as the state strikes Hispanic jurors when the defendant is Hispanic,
Asian jurors when the defendant is Asian, and so on. 70 But this
seems to miss the point. Except in the most pressing situations,
such as cell assignments in prison where safety is a concern 7' or
72
in the interest of maintaining racial balance in public housing,
there are very few instances where the state is permitted to differentiate among citizens solely on the basis of race. The naked use
of race by the prosecution to remove qualified jurors, taking place
as it does in a court of law before a room full of fellow citizens,

j,0106S.Ct. at 1745.

"'See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968). See also Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321
(1972); Holt v. Hutto, 363 F.Supp. 194, 203 (E.D. Ark. 1973), modified, 505 F.2d 194 (8th
Cir. 1974).
"'See Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 484 F.2d 1122, 1135-36 (2d Cir. 1973).
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simply has no analog. Rehnquist's argument seems to be that many
73
wrongs make a right. 1
But problems start to emerge when one tries to understand Batson
in the context of peremptory challenges used to select jurors. It
soon becomes clear that the Court has seriously oversimplified the
nature of peremptory challenges and their traditional role in the
jury selection process. The result is an opinion that sounds nice in
theory, but that seems very detached from what happens at trial.
To understand the problems more fully, consider the jury selection process in Kentucky from which Batson emerged. Kentucky
uses the so-called "struck jury system," in which the first step in
jury selection is the questioning of all prospective jurors on the
panel.' 74 The questioning is conducted by the trial judge, or, in the
judge's discretion, by the prosecutor and the defense attorney.'
If, during the questioning of the jury panel members, there develops
"reasonable ground to believe that a prospective juror cannot render
a fair and impartial verdict on the evidence," the Kentucky Rules
of Criminal Procedure provide that the juror is to be excused for
cause. 176
Only after all challenges for cause have been made and ruled
upon and only after completion of the entire voir dire does the
exercise of peremptory challenges take place. 77 The task of exercising peremptory challenges is made easier for the lawyers in a
struck jury system because the lawyers are given a rather short list
of jurors, selected at random from the panel member from which
the lawyers are allowed to "strike" prospective jurors. The list is
limited to the number of jurors to be seated plus the number of
peremptory challenges allowed both sides. 178 In Batson's case, because the court was seeking a jury of twelve and one alternate, 79
the lawyers had twenty-eight names on the list. The prosecutor
'Justice Rehnquist's starting premise also seems questionable, because there are indications that prosecutors often use peremptory challenges to strike prospective black jurors even
when the defendant is not black. See note 190 infra.
'On the variety of systems in use for the selection of juries, see generally 2 LaFave &
Israel, Criminal Procedure §21.3 (1984).
'Ky. R. Crim. P. 9.38.
1761d. at 9.36 (1).
'77Ibid.
"'I1d. at 9.36 (2).
111106 S.Ct. at 1715 n.2.
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was allowed to strike six names from the list and the defense nine. 810
The exercise of peremptories takes place simultaneously with each
side striking the jurors not wanted from the list and returning the
list to the trial judge. 18' If, after the peremptory challenges are
exercised there are more than the number of jurors being sought
remaining on the list, 18 the judge eliminates at random the extra
jurors to arrive at a jury of twelve (plus alternates).
Contrast the actual process of jury selection in Kentucky with
the picture of peremptory challenges offered in the opinions of
Justice Powell and Justice White in Batson. Justice Powell, for the
majority, concluded that it is a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause for a prosecutor to strike blacks from a jury on the assumption that "black jurors as a group will be unable impartially
to consider the State's case against a black defendant."' 83 Justice
White in his concurrence similarly condemned prosecutors who use
peremptories to exclude blacks "on the assumption that no black
juror could fairly judge a black defendant."18 s4 But the assumption
that peremptory challenges are exercised in a system like that in
Kentucky on the basis of categorical judgments about the inability
of large groups of citizens to be "impartial" or "fair" gives a misleading impression of the nature of peremptory challenges.
The terms "biased" and "unbiased" and "partial" and "impartial"
are ambiguous in the context of jury selection. As far as the law is
concerned, jurors who are not challengeable for cause are people
who are unbiased and impartial with respect to the individual case
to be tried. This is clear in Kentucky: those jurors who are not
challengeable for cause are those jurors for whom there is no "reasonable ground" to believe that they "cannot render a fair and
impartial verdict on the evidence."''8 5 Obviously, this does not mean
that they are all the same in terms of values, religious beliefs,
political leanings, experience, sex, race, background, and all those
things that make each of us different. But it means that none of
I"'See note 84 supra.
1

18Ky. R. Grim. P. 9.36 (2).

"'There would be more than the desired number of jurors if either side chooses not to
exercise all of its allotted peremptory challenges or if both sides have jurors in common on
their strike list.
18106 S.Ct. at 1719.

18Id. at 1725.
115See text at note 176 supra.
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these people has been shown to be biased in the sense that he or
she cannot judge the case before the court on the basis of the
evidence and in accordance with the court's instructions.
The characterization of peremptory challenges as involving strikes
of jurors because of a belief that they cannot be "impartial" or
"cannot fairly judge the defendant" is not an accurate reflection of
what happens. This is language appropriate for challenges for cause
and not peremptory challenges as traditionally exercised. What
really happens at the peremptory challenges stage is comparison
shopping, with each side trying to remove prospective jurors who
are perceived as being less favorable in the hope of getting jurors
who are more favorable on the petit jury. Kentucky, by providing
for an initial voir dire of all prospective jurors and then narrowing
the list of prospective jurors to twenty-eight jurors from which the
final twelve plus an alternate will be seated, makes the process of
comparison shopping much easier for the parties. The parties are
aware of the full spectrum of jurors from which the petit jury will
be selected and can make their decisions as to which jurors they
wish to strike accordingly.
What makes a juror favorable or unfavorable in this process depends on the particular case and the people and issues involved in
the trial. A lawyer may believe, for example, that a certain prospective juror will be more (or less) sympathetic to the defendant
than other jurors, or may be more (or less) sympathetic to the
lawyer's arguments, or may be more (or less) sympathetic to a key
prosecution witness, or may even be more (or less) sympathetic to
the lawyer himself, and so on. But it is important to see that while
there may be some jurors struck whom one of the lawyers believes
should have been struck by the trial judge from the jury for cause, 186
most of the jurors struck through peremptory challenges will be
struck because one of the lawyers believes that he can obtain a juror
who will be easier to persuade of the merits of his side of the case.
A prosecutor will obviously try to get people on the jury who
will be easiest to convince of the merits of the prosecution's case
while the defense will try to get jurors who are likely to be sympathetic to the defendant or the defendant's plight. In trying to
decide which jurors are favorable or unfavorable, if a juror shares
1'Judges usually will not excuse jurors for cause unless the showing of bias on the part
of the prospective juror is blatant. See Kuhn, note 32 supra, at 243-44.
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a strong group identity with the defendant, that juror will be viewed
with concern or suspicion by the prosecution. If the defendant is
a Shiite Muslim, a prosecutor will be worried that a prospective
juror who shares the same religion might be more sympathetic to
the defendant than someone who has no such common religious
ground with the defendant. This is not to say that the prosecutor
who strikes a Shiite Muslim prior to the trial is making a judgment
that the particular juror struck is "biased" or "partial" to the defendant in the sense that the juror could not decide the case on the
basis of the evidence presented and the instructions given. Rather
the prosecutor does not want to take the risk that the juror's strong
religious identity with the defendant will make it harder for the
prosecution to convince the juror of the defendant's guilt than would
be the case with a juror who does not share an important emotional
bond with the defendant.
The same is true for the defense: if the victim of the crime is a
Shiite Muslim, the defense attorney may be worried that a juror
who shares the victim's religion may be more sympathetic to the
plight of the victim (and the prosecution's case) than a juror without
a common group affiliation.
Obviously, it is always open to the prosecution or the defense to
inquire into possible bias on the part of a prospective juror due to
a shared religious heritage, but a number of factors discourage such
questioning. In the first place, such an inquiry is not likely to be
fruitful. Few people in our society are likely to admit that they
cannot fairly decide the merits of the case before them because of
a religious, racial, or ethnic bias. 8 7 Secondly, such an inquiry requires great tact. The lawyer runs the risk of insulting not just the
8
person asked about bias but other prospective jurors as well.
Thirdly, even if one decides to risk such a delicate inquiry, the
answers one receives may not resolve the worry about a juror's
inclinations and biases. Besides the problem of juror embarrassment
at admitting bias, there is the additional worry that a person may
want very much to serve on the jury and may give answers that
are not candid or truthful in order to achieve that objective: "Experienced litigators know, and empirical studies have substantiated,
that it is part of the psychology of the venire for some people to
'"See Saltzburg and Powers, note 32 supra, at 355; Van Dyke, note 8 supra, at 163.
188Van Dyke, id., at 163.
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decide that they want to be on the jury. To that end such people
will evade or misconstrue, unconsciously or deliberately, general
voir dire questions in order to avoid answering and possibly being
struck."'' I

9

Perhaps a more important reason why voir dire will not satisfy
a lawyer's concern over possible bias on the part of prospective
jurors is the fact that the bias that a trial lawyer would be concerned
about is not just a conscious bias or partiality in favor of one who
shares the same religious or ethnic identity but is rather a subconscious predisposition that may influence a juror's reaction to the
evidence even where the juror is trying to be scrupulously fair.
Because of the subtlety of subconscious influences, most prosecutors (or defense attorneys) would probably be strongly inclined to
strike Shiite Muslims from the jury in a situation where the defendant (or the victim) is a Shiite Muslim. It is a traditional function
of peremptory challenges to serve as a safety net in order to allow
a lawyer to remove jurors whom the lawyer believes may be inclined
toward the other side but whom the lawyer cannot show to be
biased. Prospective jurors who admit to being prejudiced or biased
in favor of one side or the other side will be removed for cause. By
contrast, peremptories allow a lawyer to remove a juror who the
lawyer believes is either subconsciously biased in favor of the other
side and thus will never admit to being biased or a juror who is
consciously biased in favor of the other side but who is not being
wholly candid in his responses.
When the role of peremptory challenges in the jury selection
process is properly understood, one can see that it is not correct
for the Court to interpret systematic strikes of prospective jurors
because of a shared group identity with the defendant as an assertion
that no member of such group "could impartially judge the defendant." Asked on the basis of limited knowledge to rank particular
jurors on a panel in terms of their desirability, those who share a
strong group identity with the defendant will often be viewed as
unfavorable jurors from the prosecution's point of view as compared
to jurors who have no strong group identity with the defendant.'90
InBabcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "It's Wonderful Power," 27 Stan. L. Rev. 545, 547
(1975).
190Although the Court in Batson focuses on the striking of black jurors when the defendant
is also black, blacks and other minorities are likely to be struck in many cases that involve
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SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND INGROUP BIAS

There is, of course, a broad literature on jury selection and litigators have always tried to categorize citizens so as to give them
an edge in selecting a favorable jury. Much of the traditional lawyers'
folklore on supposedly desirable jurors for the plaintiff or the defense seems incredible. However, the situation on which Batson
specifically focuses-the striking of prospective jurors because they
share a group identity with the defendant-is one as to which there
is a considerable amount of empirical evidence that helps explain
why a prosecutor (or a defense attorney) might view a juror who
has a common bond with the defendant (or the victim) as risky.
The reason that litigators might be worried about a shared group
identity is the phenomenon of "ingroup-outgroup bias" that is an
accepted tenet of social psychology' 9' and is discussed in virtually
all basic texts in the field. 192 One such text explains the phenomenon
as follows: 93
We all tend to evaluate ingroup members more positively than
outgroup members, partly because assimilation and contrast
lead us to misperceive the degree of similarity that exists within
and between groups. Instead of looking for similarities we focus
on dissimilarities between the groups. This ingroup-outgroup
bias doesn't apply just to ethnic groups ....

It appears to occur

whenever people are categorized.
Ingroup-outgroup bias is explained as the inevitable outcome of
a desire to maintain a positive self-image; there thus emerges a
non-minority defendants, because they are sometimes viewed as being less likely to credit
the testimony of the police or as favoring defendants in general. Justice Marshall, in his
opinion in Batson, noted that an instruction book in a Dallas County prosecutors' office
warned that peremptory challenges should be used to eliminate "any member of a minority
group' 106 S.Ct. at 1727, quoting from Van Dyke, note 8 supra, at 152. See also text at
notes 11-12 supra. Justice Marshall went on to explain that in 100 felony trials in that county
in 1983-84, prosecutors peremptorily struck 405 out of 467 eligible black jurors. 106 S.Ct.
at 1727.
' 9'A detailed analysis of the experimental literature is contained in Brewer, In-Group Bias
in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A Cognitive-Motivational Analysis, 86 Psychological
Bull. 307 (1979).
192See, e.g., Baron & Byrne, Social Psychology: Understanding Human Interaction 18284 (4th ed. 1984); Penrod, Social Psychology 334-35 (2d ed. 1986); Sears, Freedman, &
Peplau, Social Psychology 82-83 (5th ed. 1985); Perlman & Cozby, Social Psychology 42324 (1983); Gergen & Gergen, Social Psychology 139 (2d ed. 1986).
'93Perlman & Cozby, note 192 supra, at 423. See also Gergen & Gergen, note 192 supra,
at 139.
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tendency to emphasize traits of the ingroup that allows members
of that group to feel superior to members of the outgroup, with
the result that stereotypes of the ingroup tend to be positive and
stereotypes of the outgroup negative. 94 So strong is the phenomenon that experimental studies have shown that even where subjects
are divided into groups in an arbitrary, trivial, and temporary fashion, having no relationship to any social categories existing outside
the experimental setting, the subjects tended to have more positive
feelings toward members of their own groups and more negative
feeling toward members of the outgroup. ,95 These and other studies
demonstrate that social categorization per se produces ingroup
favoritism. 196
It is important to emphasize that ingroup bias is a universal
phenomenon stemming from the very fact of group identity. But
given our history of racial problems and the tension that has existed
between races in parts of this country, it may be that ingroupoutgroup bias is more acute between racial groups than is true of
some other group affiliations. 97 When one understands the phenomenon of ingroup bias, it is not surprising that an empirical study
in mock jury situations concluded that in close cases a white juror
is likely to give the benefit of the doubt to a white defendant, but
not to a black defendant, and a black juror is more likely to give
the benefit of the doubt to a black defendant but not to a white
defendant. 198
Perhaps confirming the general experimental conclusion that ingroup favoritism is stronger when a group sees itself as
a minority,' 99 the same jury study concluded that "black subjects
tended to grant the black defendant the benefit of the doubt not
only when the evidence is [sic] doubtful but even when there was
''2
strong evidence against him. 00
19See Baron & Byrne, note 192 supra, at 183; Perlman & Cozby, note 192 supra, at 424.
19

See Penrod, note 192 supra, at 334-34; Baron & Byrne, note 192 supra, at 183; Perlman
& Cozby, note 192 supra, at 423-24.
'96See Penrod, note 192 supra, at 334. See Tajfel & Turner, An Interpretive Theory of
Intergroup Conflict, in Austin & Worchel, The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations
38 (1979).
197
Ingroup favoritism may be especially strong if the ingroup perceives itself to be a minority
group. See Gergen & Gergen, note 192 supra, at 139; see also Brewer, note 191 supra, at
318.

'"See Ugwvuegbu, Racial and Evidential Factors in Juror Attribution of Legal Responsibility, 15 J. Experimental Soc. Psychology 133, 139-41 (1979).
1

99See Penrod, note 192 supra, at 334.
0°See Ugvuegbu, note 198 supra, at 141-42. For a complete review of the social science

2
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C. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES RELATED TO RACE AFrER BATSON

Empirical studies establishing the phenomenon of ingroup bias
do not demonstrate either the wisdom or the necessity of our system
of peremptory challenges. But they help explain why, in a system
where lawyers are supposed to "deselect" unfavorable jurors, a juror's group affiliations, such as his or her age, race, religion, ethnic
origin, and neighborhood background, are central to the exercise
of peremptory challenges.2 0' Swain recognized the important role
that suspect classifications have always played in peremptory
02
challenges:
It [the peremptory challenge] is no less frequently exercised on
grounds normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or
official action, namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation
or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty. For the question a prosecutor or defense counsel must decide is not whether
a juror of a particular race or nationality is in fact partial, but
whether one from a different group is less likely to be....
Hence veniremen are not always judged solely as individuals
for the purpose of exercising peremptory challenges. Rather
they are challenged in light of the limited knowledge counsel
has of them, which may include group affiliations, in the context
of the case to be tried.
Swain drew a sharp distinction between the use of race in the
selection of the venire and the use of race (and other suspect classifications) as a basis for the exercise of peremptory challenges when
exercised for trial-related reasons which the Court upheld as a legitimate basis for the exercise of peremptory challenges. 03
Although the Court in Batson suggested in places that it was
simply changing the "evidentiary burden" that Swain had placed
on defendants if they were to make out a violation of the Equal
literature, see generally Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 Mich. L. Rev.
1611, 1625-30 (1985).
2
'See, e.g., I Lane, note 12 supra, §§9.44, 9.45; Perlman, Jury Selection, in National
Institute of Trial Advocacy, Master Advocates' Handbook 59, 77-78 (1985); Kestler, Questioning Techniques and Tactics, §3.20, p. 98 (1982).
202380 U.S. at 220-21.
20
"The three dissenters in Swain did not challenge the propriety of using race for trialrelated reasons as part of the peremptory challenge process. Justice Goldberg's dissent argued
that the evidence in the case showed that no black had ever served on a petit jury in the
county in which Swain had been tried and that this evidence of systematic exclusion of
blacks from jury service constituted a prima facie case of racial discrimination requiring the
state to disprove such discrimination. 380 U.S. at 238-39.
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Protection Clause,2°4 in fact Batson represented an abrupt break with
Swain. The Court in Batson condemned the exercise of peremptory
challenges by a prosecutor on the basis of race even if such challenges were exercised for trial-related reasons. The Court explained
2 05
this change as follows:

Although a prosecutor ordinarily is entitled to exercise peremptory challenge "for any reason at all, as long as that reason
is related to his view concerning the outcome" of the case to be
tried, the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to
challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on
the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant.
To understand the implications of Batson, consider a case with
strong racial overtones. In such a case prior to Batson, a prosecutor
might have used peremptory challenges to remove many or all jurors
of the same race as the defendant because he might assume that
these jurors would be more sympathetic to the defendant and more
inclined to believe his version of the events. But, after Batson, should
there be a "pattern" of strikes that appear to be based on race, the
prosecutor will have to rebut the inference of discrimination. While
the prosecutor's reason "need not rise to the level justifying exercise
of a challenge for cause," the Court warned that a prosecutor's
''assumption" or "his intuitive judgment" that the jurors will be
partial to the defendant because of their shared racial background

2°6
will not rebut such a claim.

How far beyond a prosecutor's "intuitions" and "assumptions"
does the Court mean this restriction on peremptory challenge to
extend? Obviously, the Court intends to cover the situation where
the prosecutor reflexively strikes jurors solely on the basis of race,
perhaps even without extensive voir dire. However, the Court presumably intends its ruling to apply to more complicated uses of
race. Assume that the prosecutor has managed to engage one of the
new breed of jury selection experts. Such experts view the old
folklore about desirable and undesirable jurors as too crude and
unsophisticated.2 0

7

Instead, they make use of such social science

104106 S.Ct. at 1714, 1720-21.
205

1d. at 1718-19.

"'1d. at 1723.
2

°"The difficulty with folk wisdom of any kind is that it is too general, too global." I
Ginger, note 8 supra, at §5.2.
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tools as community surveys in the jurisdiction where the trial will
take place so that the lawyer who is to pick the jury starts with a
more sophisticated and accurate picture of the attitudes of different
segments of the community. By correlating a subject's answers on
the survey with his or her personal characteristics, such as race,
religion, marital status, income, occupation, age, and residence, the
survey yields a demographic picture of desirable and undesirable
208
jurors in the particular community where the trial will take place.
While this is a more sophisticated (and more expensive2°9) approach to jury selection than simply relying on the trial lawyer's
instincts, the difference is one of degree. In the use of social science
techniques to aid jury selection, race and other suspect classifications are still important, and in a case with strong racial overtones,
race may well be a dominant factor in the demographic picture of
desirable and undesirable jurors. For example, in the trial of black
militant H. Rap Brown, one of the early cases in which the defense
used extensive community surveys to construct a demographic picture of desirable and undesirable jurors, "black people" were listed
prominently on the list of the "best jurors for the defense" and
"white males over forty-five" were among the "worst jurors for the
defense. 210 Presumably, if the prosecution were to use such demographic information to strike, for example, "blacks under thirty"
on the basis of a demographic profile suggesting strong resentment
toward the prosecution's case among such members of the community, such challenges would be unconstitutional after Batson. On
the one hand, the prosecutor is not basing his challenges simply on
his personal "assumption" that all blacks would "be partial to the
defendant because of their shared race," but neither are his challenges neutral as to race and that appears to be what the Court
demands, given its heavy reliance on the venire cases. 2 1'
20SId. at §§5.25-5.38; Van Dyke, note 8 supra, at 183-89.
°'Fees for a community survey run about $35 per person polled with experts preferring
to survey at least 250 people and preferably 500 to 1,000. See Couric, Jury Sleuths: In
Search of the Perfect Panel, 45 Nat'l L.J., July 21, 1986, at 1 col. 1.
21°See I Ginger, note 8 supra, §5.37.
2

2"The Court relied heavily on McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d at 1132, in explaining the
burden that it was placing on a prosecutor after a prima facie case of discrimination had
been raised. 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24 n.20. McCray was very specific-the prosecution can only
rebut a prima facie case of discrimination by showing "permissible racially neutral selection
criteria" have produced the result in question. 750 F.2d at 1132.
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CAN IT BE ENFORCED?

In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger quoted a passage from an
essay by Professor Barbara Babcock which bluntly but accurately
describes the traditional nature of peremptory challenges:2" 2
The peremptory, made without giving any reason, avoids trafficking in the core of truth in most common stereotypes....
Common human experience, common sense, psychological
studies, and public opinion polls tell us that it is likely that
certain classes of people statistically have predispositions that
would make them inappropriate jurors for particular kinds of
cases. But to allow this knowledge to be expressed in the evaluative terms necessary for challenges for cause would undercut
our desire for a society in which all people are judged as individuals and in which each is held reasonable and open to compromise ....

Instead we have evolved in the peremptory chal-

lenge a system that allows the covert expression of what we
dare not say but know is true more often than not.
Whether we should have a system that allows challenges on the
basis of "what we dare not say but know is true" is an important
question, and one on which Justice Marshall challenged the majority
in his concurring opinion when he argued that we should constitutionally abolish peremptory challenges. 2 3 The problem with Batson is that it tries to have things both ways-allow the traditional
system of peremptory challenges but insist that the state be race
neutral in the selection of the petit jury. The result is an enforcement
nightmare. In the venire cases, when a prima facie case of discrimination has been shown by the defense, the burden shifts to the
state to show that "permissible racially neutral selection criteria"
produced the resulting venire.2 ' 4 Batson sees the selection of the
venire and the selection of the petit jury as quite similar and borrows
the language and machinery of those cases and applies it to the
issue of peremptory challenges. In three different places the Court
stated that a prosecutor who is properly challenged to explain his
peremptory strikes must articulate "a neutral explanation" in defense of his challenges.215
212106 S.Ct. at 1735-36, quoting Babcock, note 189 supra, at 553-54.
213

For a discussion of Justice Marshall's proposal to abolish peremptory challenges, see
text starting at note 265 infra.
2
21

See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972).
5See 106 S.Ct. at 1723; ibid.; id. at 1725.
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In assembling the venire, we have a good sense of what neutral
selection criteria might be. In the world of peremptory challenges,
where it is acceptable to challenge jurors based on hunches, body
language, pop psychology, political preferences, and economic status, and where lawyers are encouraged to strike jurors on the basis
of their subjective feelings and impulses, 1 6 there is no content to
the notion of a "neutral explanation." As Justice Marshall explained
21 7
in his concurrence,
[Any prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for
striking jurors and trial courts are ill-equipped to second-guess
those reasons. How is the court to treat a prosecutor's statement
that he struck a juror because the juror had a son about the
same age as the defendant, or seemed "uncommunicative," or
"never cracked a smile" and "therefore did not possess the sensitivities necessary to realistically look the issues and decide the
facts in this case"?
Justice Marshall's concern that the protections erected by Batson
"may be illusory" was directed not simply at dishonesty on the part
of a prosecutor but at "conscious or unconscious racism" which he
feared might lead a prosecutor to the conclusion that "a prospective
black juror is 'sullen,' or 'distant,' a characterization that would not
have come to mind if a white juror had acted identically."2 1 8 He also
worried that a "judge's own conscious or unconscious racism may
21 9
lead him to accept such an explanation as well supported.*
The majority's reply to Justice Marshall, that it had "no reason
to believe that prosecutors will not fulfill their duty to exercise their
challenges only for legitimate reasons, 220 fails to appreciate the odd
and inconsistent world in which Batson has placed prosecutors.
Prosecutors may strike jurors for any reason they want-their body
language, their manner of speech, their sex, their religion, their
clothing, their occupation, or their level of education-as long as
they don't strike them because of their race. Indeed, they must not
21
6See, e.g., James and Starr, Selection of a Jury in a Personal Injury Case, in CLE, Inc.
of Colorado, Jury Selection-Picking the Winners 50, 58 (1982); Spence, Some Unscholarly
Observations on Jury Selection, contained in Nat'l College for Criminal Defense, Jury
Selection Techniques 31, 41 (1980).
217106 S.Ct. at 1728 (citations omitted).

2'Ilbid.
2lglbid.
20Id. at 1724 n.22.
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strike jurors because of their race, even in a case that has clear racial
overtones, where jury experts would fully support their strikes and
where the defense is striking jurors systematically on a racial basis.
One of the first appellate decisions to apply Batson demonstrates
the difficulty that courts face in resolving an equal protection challenge to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges. In Branch
" ' the prosecutors at the trial of a black defendant
v. State,22
charged
with murder used six of their seven peremptory challenges to strike
six of the seven blacks on the venire. At a hearing challenging the
use of the peremptories, the prosecution offered nonracial explanations for each of the six challenges. One juror was challenged
because he was a scientist and it was feared that his background
would put too much pressure on the prosecution. 2 2 A second juror
was challenged because he was similar in age and appearance to
the defendant and he might have had a relationship to a person
arrested in an unrelated criminal case several months earlier.223 The
third juror was struck because she had been unemployed and had
a kind of "dumbfounded or bewildered look on her face" as if
uncertain about what she was supposed to do. 224 The fourth juror
was struck because she was a single female about the same age as
the defendant and it was feared that she "might feel as though she
were a sister . . . and have some pity on the [defendant].2 2 5 The
fifth juror was challenged because it was the prosecutor's general
experience that employees of the company where the juror worked
had not been attentive as jurors and some employees at the company
were being investigated for a variety of crimes. 226 Finally, the sixth
juror was struck because he was unkempt in appearance and gruff
in manner, which might place him at odds with other jurors. 22 7 The
trial court found that the prosecution's reasons for its strikes were
neutral and legitimate and the appellate court affirmed, concluding
that the trial court followed Batson "with caution and sensitivity. ' 22
I"

So.2d -

1

(Ala. Crim. App. 1986).

"Ibid.
223bid.
4

22 bid.
"2'lbid.
226Ibid.
227Ibid.

2'Ibid. On certiorari in Branch, the Alabama Supreme Court issued procedures and guidelines to try to help trial courts apply Batson and remanded the case to the trial court for
reconsideration in light of those guidelines. Exparte Branch,__ So.2d (Ala. 1987).
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Branch suggests that Justice Marshall's predictions about the difficulties of enforcement may turn out to be accurate. Evaluating
peremptory challenges is an awkward inquiry for an appellate court
and Batson conceded that because a trial judge's findings with respect
to an equal protection claim "largely will turn on evaluation of
credibility, a reviewing court should give those finding great deference."22 9 Given the traditional control that trial judges have over
voir dire and the fact-specific nature of peremptory challenges in
general, it seems safe to predict that there will be significant variation in the application of Batson from judge to judge. Some judges
will be willing to accept facially neutral explanations, like those
offered the trial judge in Branch, while other judges will find such
explanations unacceptable where the result-the striking of six of
seven blacks-seems to suggest that race may have been a factor in
the decision to strike those jurors.
At the other end of the spectrum from Branch, one can expect
cases like those that have arisen in California where the California
Supreme Court has had to struggle to make its decision in Wheeler
" ' for example, the court reversed the
work.2z 0 In People v. Trevino,23
defendant's murder conviction. The majority disagreed with the
trial court's conclusion that the prosecutor had satisfactorily explained his reasons for peremptorily challenging certain jurors who
had Spanish surnames. In Trevino, the majority and the dissent
went through the peremptory challenges juror by juror, with the
majority sometimes indicating that there were "internal inconsistencies" or a "lack of uniformity" in the district attorney's reasoning. 232 More interesting was the appellate court's outright refusal
to accept certain reasons offered by the prosecutor as sufficient. An
example of the latter was the appellate court's refusal to accept as
proper a challenge based on a juror's body language and mode of
answering certain questions: in rejecting the challenge, the court
stated that although the prosecutor had provided a "specific reason"
for his challenge, this did not satisfy the requirement set out in

29106 S.Ct. at 1724 n.21.

2"°See, e.g., People v. Turner, 42 Cal.3d 711, 230 Cal. Rptr. 656, 726 P.2d 102 (1986);
People v. Motton, 39 Cal.3d 596, 217 Cal. Rptr. 416, 704 P.2d 176 (1985); People v. Hall,
35 Cal.3d 161, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71, 672 P.2d 854 (1983).
23139 Cal.3d 667, 217 Cal. Rptr. 652, 704 P.2d 719 (Cal. 1985).
M'704 P.2d at 733.
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Wheeler that the prosecutor must base his challenge on "specific
bias.

'2

1

Trevino makes clear what was implicit in Wheeler: that the

supreme court was in essence cutting back sharply the traditional
rules governing peremptory challenges. Only reasons that come
very close to establishing the basis for a challenge for cause will be
acceptable when there is an inquiry into a peremptory challenge
under Wheeler.
IV.

BATSON AND OUR SYSTEM OF JUSTICE

The systematic use of peremptory challenges to strike jurors
on the basis of race threatens public confidence, especially among
minorities, in the criminal justice system. At a time when nearly
one out of two persons admitted to prisons in this country is black, 34
when there are deep concerns over racial discrimination in the
imposition of the death penalty,35 and when there is serious concern
over renewed racial tension in parts of this country, a system that
allows prosecutors to begin a trial by removing all or substantially
all the racial minorities on the jury panel sends exactly the wrong
message to our citizens.
Against this background, one can certainly understand how Justice Marshall, and others, would welcome the majority's opinion
as "an historic step" toward eliminating racial discrimination in the
use of peremptory challenges while at the same time acknowledging
that the remedy Batson offers may be "illusory." I reach a different
conclusion on that balance: Batson is an unfortunate decision with
too many weaknesses, even given the serious problem it was attempting to remedy.
A. THE COSTS OF THE DECISION

To begin with, one has to understand Batson in the context of a
trial system that has been recognized over and over as one of the
most elaborate and expensive in the world. 23 6 Our trial procedure11i1d. at 731-32.
23

S4ee Langan, Racism on Trial: New Evidence to Explain the Racial Composition of
Prisons in the United States, 76 J. Crim. L. & Crim. 666 (1985).
2"See Greenberg, Against the American System of Capital Punishment, 99 Harv. L. Rev.
1670, 1676 (1986). See also McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S.Ct. 1756 (1987).
"16See, e.g., Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services
and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1808, 1824
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with its pretrial hearings, sophisticated rules of evidence, and heavy
reliance on lay juries-is more complicated, more expensive, and
more time-consuming than that of any European system. It is so
expensive in fact that we do not use it and can not use it in the
vast majority of criminal cases. It is plea bargaining, which is estimated to be responsible for about 90 percent of the convictions
in this country, 3 7 that enables the system to keep going. But even
with plea bargaining there are often reports of near breakdowns in
the system, especially in state trial courts of limited jurisdiction
where minor felonies and misdemeanors are tried. It has been reported that in the New York Criminal Court, which handles minor
crimes, such as shoplifting, minor assaults, and minor drug offenses,
judges have a caseload of 100 cases a day and only one half of 1
percent of their 200,000 cases can be tried. 38 New York is not alone:
the inability of the system to keep up with its volume of cases has
frustrated efforts in Los Angeles to enforce tougher drunk driving
laws 3 9 and in the District of Columbia to enforce tougher drug
2
laws. 4
With respect to the intricacies of our trial procedures, one area
that is a particular scandal is voir dire. In New York, where lawyers
have traditionally controlled voir dire, one study of eleven counties
found that the average voir dire took two days and consumed 40
percent of the trial time.24 ' In 20 percent of the cases studied, the
voir dire took longer than the trial itself. 42 And it is not unusual
for jury selection in some felony trials to take weeks and occasionally
2 43
even months.
(1986); Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 3, 11 (1978).
23
'See Cramer, Rossman, & McDonald, The Judicial Role in Plea-Bargaining, in Plea
Bargaining 139, 139 (McDonald & Cramer eds. 1980).
23
Editorial, Cattle Car Justice, New York Times, July 2, 1983, at 20, col. 1. Other
jurisdictions have similar problems. See, e.g., Bruske and Kamen, Waiting forJustice, Wash.
Post, July 24, 1983, at Al, col. 1.
239
Banks, Courts Struggle with Logjam of Drunk-Driving Cases, Los Angeles Times,
August 5, 1983, §11 at 1, col. 1.
24OBruske, Plea Bargains Erode Drug Law's Intent, Wash. Post, May 12, 1986, at Al,
col. 5.
241
See Who Should PickJurors, Attorneys or the Judge, New York Times, June 13, 1984,
§I1, at 4, col. 3. See also Justice Accelerates, New York Times, June 15, 1984, at A26,
col. 1.
24
1 See Who Should Pick Jurors, Attorneys or the Judge, note 241 supra.
243

1t has been reported that it took nine months to pick a jury in one California murder
trial. See Rohrlich, Nine Months Taken to Seat Murder Jury, Los Angeles Times, February
14, 1984, §1, at 3, col. 6.
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Against this background, Batson v. Kentucky adds a new level of
complexity to voir dire and puts pressure on prosecutors to conduct
more extensive questioning of prospective jurors in order to be in
a position to explain and defend particular peremptory challenges
if necessary. The California Supreme Court, in the wake of Wheeler,
has warned trial courts that it would be unfair to deny counsel a
"significant opportunity to probe under the surface to determine
the potential juror's individual attitudes" and leave counsel a "Catch22 alternative of making his decision on the superficial basis we
4
held impermissible in Wheeler, or making it on no basis at all." 4
The exact cost of the decision in Batson in terms of trial time
consumed by voir dire and challenges to the prosecutor's use of
peremptory challenges is uncertain, partly because the contours of
the opinion are so vague and partly because it is uncertain how
courts will tackle the enforcement problems. A reform that requires
trial judges to sift through challenges to "peremptory" challenges
continues the present overemphasis on voir dire. It seems a step in
the wrong direction as far as the efficiency of the system is concerned.
The closest the majority opinion comes to the subject of cost or
strain on the trial system is a single line in which the Court rejected
the state's argument that the decision would create "serious administrative difficulties" by explaining that courts that have adopted
similar standards for the review of peremptory challenges by the
prosecutor-an apparent reference to California and Massachusetts-"have not experienced serious administrative burdens."2 4 In
support of this assertion, Justice Powell's opinion cited People v.
Hall,'- a California Supreme Court decision, in which, according
to Justice Powell, "the California Supreme Court found that there
was no evidence to show that procedures implementing its version
of this standard . . . were burdensome for trial judges.."2 47 In fact,
this summary of Hallis not accurate. The California Supreme Court
did not find that there was no evidence that the standard announced
under Wheeler was burdensome, but rather the court stated that
"the People have not produced, or called to our attention, any

44

' People v. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d 392, 174 Cal. Rptr. 317, 628 P.2d 869, 875 (1981).
141106 S.Ct. at 1724.
24635

CaI.3d 161, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71, 672 P.2d 854 (1983).

247106 S.Ct. at 1724 n.23.
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empirical evidence in support of their criticism of Wheeler. '248 But
the reliance on Hall is whistling in the dark in any case, because
in the two-year period after the Court hinted in McCray v. Abram
that it might reconsider its stance on peremptory challenges,249
federal trial judges continued to raise serious doubts about the
wisdom and efficacy of requiring judicial scrutiny of peremptory
challenges.
In King v. County of Nassau'2 50 shortly after the federal district
court decision in McCray was handed down, 25 ' a federal trial judge
in the same district expressed deep concern in a civil case over the
impact that overruling Swain would have on the trial process. He
2 12

argued:

Even assuming the existence of a clear theoretical rule regarding
what types of peremptory challenges are legal, enormous difficulties would arise from any attempt to implement such a rule
in practice. A great deal of time, effort and expense would be
necessary to attempt to determine whether any given peremptory challenge is legal. Any such determination would entail
the extremely difficult task of assessing the internal motives of
the attorneys. It might also require an inquiry by the Court
into the ethnic or religious backgrounds of prospective jurors,
thereby promoting the very emphasis on such factors which the
rule seeks to avoid ....

Most important of all, attorneys, con-

fronted with a rule completely or partially restricting their right
to act with the internal motive of helping their clients when
making peremptory challenges, will be under enormous pressure to lie regarding their motives. Such a rule will foster hypocrisy and disrespect for our system of justice. Indeed, it is
even possible that an attorney may lie to himself in an effort to
convince himself that his motives are legal. Rather than introduce such a rule, it would be infinitely preferable if the entire
system of peremptory challenges were abolished. ...
2 3
Shortly after the Second Circuit issued its opinion in McCray,
in which it concluded that the exercise of peremptory challenges
on the basis of race violated the Sixth Amendment, two federal
218672 P.2d at 859.
249See text at notes 63-65 supra.
2s581 F. Supp. 493, 501-02 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
25

See note 66 supra.
F. Supp. at 501-02.

2$2581
2 3

$ See text starting at note 67 supra.
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trial judges in the Southern District of New York, in separate habeas
corpus opinions involving codefendants in an arson trial, expressed
deep concern over McCray. Judge Brieant argued that while prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges is unfair, "[t]he transactional costs involved in litigating whether the reasons are 'pretextual' will be vast and the reliability of the results uncertain.

'25 4

Several months later, Judge Goettel expressed his opinion that "although well-intentioned, the McCray ruling raises innumerable
practical difficulties that outweigh its usefulness."' 215 Among the

concerns Judge Goettel raised, still unanswered after Batson, is the
26
very practical question:
If... the prosecutor uses four of his six peremptory challenges

against minority jurors and establishes a non-racial reason for
two or three of these challenges, must a mistrial be granted
because one or two challenges cannot be supported by a claim
amounting to quasi-cause?
While the burden of Batson will fall heavily on the trial courts,
there are obvious appellate costs as well, because there is not a
single aspect of Batson that is without fundamental ambiguity-the
nature of a prima facie case, the nature of a neutral explanation,
the proper remedy, and the applicability of Batson to other suspect
groupings. When one looks closely at the Batson opinion and the
number of practical and theoretical questions that the opinion leaves
unanswered, it was surely an understatement when Justice White
acknowledged in his concurrence that "[m]uch litigation will be
required to spell out the contours of the Court's Equal Protection
2 7

holding."

Balanced against the costs Batson imposes on the system, one
must keep in mind that the decision in Batson delivers quite a bit
less than it promises. In defense of its decision, the Court in Batson
reasoned that "public respect for our criminal justice system and
the rule of law will be strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is
disqualified from jury service because of his race.

' 25 8

But for all the

254Roman v. Abrams, 608 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd, 822 F.2d 214 (2d Cir.
1987).
25

Schreiber v. Salamack, 629 F. Supp. 1433, 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 822 F.2d 214.

256619 F. Supp. at 1440.
217106
258

S.Ct. at 1724.

d. at 1724.
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effort lower courts will have to put into shaping the uncertain
contours of Batson, the decision is no more than a modest step in
the quest to "ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury service
because of race." In the first place, in those jurisdictions where the
venire is unlikely to have more than two or three members of a
racial minority, Batson may have little or no effect. The equal protection safeguards of Batson require as a first step a prima facie case
of discrimination. As suggested above, what constitutes a prima
facie case is not clear, but as Justice Marshall worried,2 5 9 it seems
likely that the use of peremptory challenges by the prosecution to
remove one, two, and perhaps even three blacks from the venire
will be insulated from scrutiny.
Secondly, Batson only applies to situations where the defendant
is a member of the cognizable racial group being struck by the
prosecution. Thus prosecutors are free to strike blacks or other
racial groups of citizens on the basis of race as long as the defendant
is not black. 260 This is not an insignificant problem, especially in
an urban jurisdiction where there may be tensions between certain
minority communities and the police. Justice Marshall in his concurring opinion quoted a Dallas County prosecutors' handbook that
urged prosecutors to use peremptories generally "to eliminate any
member of a minority group," and the numbers he cites for that
county seem to suggest that prosecutors are following this advice.2 6'
This is consistent with the general trial folklore that views members
of minority groups as favorable jurors for plaintiffs in civil cases
2 62
and unfavorable jurors for the prosecution in criminal cases.
Thirdly, Batson deals only with the use of peremptory challenges
by prosecutors and says nothing about the use of peremptory challenges by the defense to remove jurors solely on account of race.
The majority opinion is careful to "express no views on whether
the constitution imposes any limit on the exercise of peremptory
25'See text at notes 116-18 supra.

"0This is one consequence of the Court's decision to apply an equal protection analysis
to the situation presented in Batson. By contrast, Wheeler, which relies on a "fair cross section"
analysis, is available to any defendant regardless of whether there is a shared racial identity
with the jurors struck. See text starting at note 136 supra.
inJustice Marshall's statistics from Dallas County would seem to suggest that it is not just
in cases where the defendant is black that the prosecution is striking black jurors. See note
190 supra. See also text at notes 11-12 supra.

"'See text at note 12 supra.
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challenges by defense counsel. 2 63 Thus, at least for the time being,

systematic exclusion of jurors on the basis of race by the defense
continues to be permitted. Finally, even where the equal protection
remedy of Batson is fully applicable, there are the general problems
of enforceability. If State v. Branch2 4 turns out to be typical of the
way Batson enforced, the gains in the number of blacks serving on
petit juries may not be substantial.
B.

JUSTICE MARSHALL'S ALTERNATIVE-THE ABOLITION OF
PREMEPTORY CHALLENGES

One of the strongest critics of the remedy imposed by Batson is
Justice Marshall in his concurring opinion. Instead of imposing on
trial courts the difficult task of sorting proper from improper peremptory challenges, Justice Marshall suggested that the Court take
a more radical approach. He would have the Court deal with dis-

crimination by completely "banning the use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors and by allowing the States to eliminate the
'
defendant's peremptory as well. "265
In some respects, the abolition of peremptory challenges would
be attractive. In the first place, a system of peremptory challenges
that forces attorneys to categorize jurors and evaluate them on the
basis of group stereotypes, public opinion polls, hunches, demographic predictions, and matters "we dare not say but know to be
true"2 66 seems offensive to our notions of the way individual citizens-whether they be prospective jurors or defendants-should
be judged. The abolition of peremptory challenges would eliminate
the use of social science experts and psychologists in jury selection
and it would help counter the impression that it is the composition
of the jury and not the evidence presented that is fundamental to
the determination of guilt or innocence at trial.167
Second, there seems a basic fairness in requiring both the prosecutor and the defense attorney to argue the case to a jury selected
263106 S.Ct. at 1718 n.12.
'6See text starting at note 221 supra.
165106 S.Ct. at 1729.
66See text at note 212 supra.
67

2 See Hunt, Putting Juries on the Couch, New York Times, Nov. 28, 1982, §VI, at 70,
82, col. 1 ("Jury selection is one of the most important functions a trial lawyer can perform;
some lawyers assert that by the time the jury has been chosen, the case has been decided.")
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randomly from the community with only challenges for cause permitted. Our system, which allows peremptory challenges to dominate and distort the jury selection process, ensures that juries rarely
reflect a cross section of the community. The prosecution works
hard to eliminate anyone who might have reason in his or her
background or outlook to sympathize with the defendant or his
plight, while the defense seeks to eliminate anyone who might be
inclined by background or outlook to judge the defendant's behavior
from a more critical perspective or to sympathize with the victim.
Given the large number of peremptory challenges available to each
side in most jurisdictions--eight for the defense and five for the
prosecution in Kentucky, 68 for example-the result is bound to be
the elimination of major segments of society from the jury.
Third, the cost to society in terms of trial time devoted to jury
selection by our system of peremptory challenges is heavy, and
Batson will increase those costs. Eliminating peremptory challenges
would narrow the scope and duration of voir dire and would eliminate some of the expense involved in assembling the extremely
large jury panels that are required to pick a jury in even the most
routine cases. Eliminating peremptory challenges would thus enable
the system to handle more trials more efficiently. In our system,
which has made trial to a jury the exception rather than the rule,
an increase in the number of trials that can be provided defendants
269
would not be an insignificant achievement.
While there are obvious benefits to abolishing peremptory challenges, the cost of such a proposal in terms of the reliability of trial
process is a difficult question and one which Justice Marshall never
addresses. Despite the rhetoric about the desirability of a "cross
section of citizens" on juries, the present system is designed to
screen out the extremes of the spectrum of jurors at both ends. One
consequence of abolishing peremptory challenges may be more hung
juries as more diverse jurors are permitted to remain on petit juries.
A blend of viewpoints and backgrounds on the jury may sound
poetic, but it may be much more difficult for such diversity to yield
unanimity. The elimination of peremptory challenges might also
increase the risk of false convictions or false acquittals. Peremptory
2

6sSee Ky. R. Crim. P. 9.30 (1) and (2).
See generally Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 931, 1017-20 (1983).
269
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challenges are a hedge against an "unlucky" roll of the jury selection
wheel, one which could sometimes result in a jury that is badly
distorted so as to favor one side or the other.
Marshall's proposal would leave the prosecutor with only challenges for cause and no other safety net during voir dire. But challenges for cause are usually drafted very narrowly, and it is often
extremely difficult to convince a judge to strike a juror for cause
unless the showing of bias is blatant. 270 The abolition of peremptory

challenges would mean that a prosecutor would be powerless to
remove a juror whom the prosecutor correctly believes the trial
judge should have removed for cause. And the prosecutor would
also be powerless to remove a prospective juror who was strongly
biased in favor of the defendant but who gave untruthful answers
during voir dire in order to avoid removal for cause. While England
has statutorily embraced the concept of nonunanimous verdicts in
criminal cases, 27' nonunanimous verdicts are very much the excep-

tion in this country2 72 and thus the impact that Justice Marshall's
extreme proposal might have on jury verdicts should be a serious
concern.
Besides being a leap into the unknown, Justice Marshall's resolution of the peremptory challenge problem-a constitutional ban
on peremptory challenges exercised by the prosecution-has other
problems. In the first place, at least until we have more empirical
information about the frequency with which racial discrimination
in the exercise of peremptory challenges occurs, a wholesale ban
on the exercise of peremptory challenges by prosecutors even in
cases where it was clear that race had no bearing on the selection
of the jury seems overbroad. Second, at some point it needs to be
explained how the Equal Protection Clause demands a ban on the
exercise of each and every peremptory challenge exercised by the
0

"1 See Saltzburg and Powers, note 32 supra, at 355-57.
'By statute, juries in England may return a verdict of conviction by a vote of 10-2 after
the jury has deliberated for two hours without reaching a unanimous verdict. Criminal
Justice Act 1967, ch. 80, §13, now to be found in the Juries Act 1974, ch. 23, §17.
1"While the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of nonunanimous jury verdicts
in criminal cases, Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 184 (1972), among the major jurisdictions
still requiring unanimous verdicts are California (Cal. Penal Code §§ 1149, 1163 (West 1985)),
New York (N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §310,80 (1982)), Texas (Tex. Code Crim. Proc. ann. art
37.04 (1981)), New Jersey (N.J. Rev. Stat. 2A:80-82 (1976)), Pennsylvania (Pa. R. Crim.
P. 1120 (b)), Illinois (Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38 §115-4 (1977), and Massachusetts (Mass. Crim.
R. 27 (a)).
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state in criminal cases, but apparently allows the state to exercise
peremptory challenges freely in civil cases.
Finally, Justice Marshall's position would lead to a very awkward
situation in jury selection until such time as legislatures could address the adversary imbalance that would result from his opinion.
The reason for this imbalance is that Justice Marshall, although
hostile to peremptory challenges exercised by either the prosecution
or the defense, would sweep away peremptory challenges under
the Equal Protection Clause only for the prosecution and would
"allow" legislatures to abolish peremptory challenge for the defense
as well. Presumably, Justice Marshall believes that the Equal Protection Clause is a limit only on the state and does not reach actions
by the defense.27 3 The immediate result of abolishing peremptory
challenges for prosecutors only would be to remove the adversary
balance that presently exists in the jury selection process until legislatures could address the imbalance. Thus, for example, in a
capital case or a major multi-defendant case that goes to trial in the
wake of an opinion abolishing the prosecution's peremptory challenges, defense lawyers might have twenty or more peremptory
challenges and the prosecution none.
C. LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE PROCESS

The majority opinion of Justice Powell and the concurring opinion of Justice Marshall are reminders that the Constitution can be
a blunt instrument for delicate procedural reform. These opinions
offer those who are interested in reform of the jury selection process
two rather unattractive alternatives--either expand the jury selection process by adding another level of factual hearings and complicated legal issues to the already complicated process of selecting
a jury, or abolish peremptory challenges for prosecutors in a single
constitutional stroke and hope that the cure does not produce serious
adverse side effects.
England has taken a different approach in its efforts to control
the peremptory challenge process.2 7 4 At early common law the num-

ber of peremptory challenges permitted was thirty-five.2

7

England

"'See text starting at note 141 supra.
2 4See generally Hughes, English Criminal Justice: Is It Better Than Ours? 26 Ariz. L.
Rev. 507, 591-95 (1984).
'See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 212.
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has gradually reduced that number: ten years ago, in response to
worries over the ability of defendants to control the ethnic composition of juries, 276 the number of peremptory challenges was
dropped from seven to three. 277 One problem with this reduction

has been that it has been a one-sided reform, aimed only at defense
peremptories because only defendants are permitted to exercise
peremptory challenges in England. 278 Instead of having peremptory

challenges, the prosecution in England has the ancient common law
right to ask individual jurors to "stand aside,

'279

which has no analog

in this country. Jurors who are asked to stand aside for the Crown
are removed from the jury box as if they have been peremptorily
challenged but they remain on the panel from which the jury is
selected and could conceivably end up on the jury should all members of the panel be exhausted, which is very unlikely.2 80 There is
no limit to the number of jurors who may be asked to stand aside,
so in effect the English prosecutor has a broader right to challenge
jurors than does the defendant. 28' Since there have been no legis-

lative limits placed on the prosecution's traditional power to ask
jurors to stand aside, the English reforms of the jury selection
process lack balance.
A reduction in the number of peremptory challenges along the
lines of the limitation on peremptories enacted in England-except
applicable to both the prosecution and the defense-would seem
to offer many of the advantages of Justice Marshall's proposal but
not nearly as many of the risks. Suppose, for example, that the
number of peremptory challenges allowed each side in criminal
cases, which presently averages nationally approximately six per
side in noncapital offenses 2 8 2 was limited to three or perhaps even

two peremptory challenges in such cases. While the Court has
always made clear that the peremptory challenge is not protected

"16See Hughes, note 274 supra, 591-92.
2"7Criminal Lav Act 1977, ch. 45, §43.
78

Juries Act 1974, ch. 23 (1) (a).
2"9See Walker, The English Legal System ch. 24, 508-09 (1985).
"'See ibid.
"8'See ibid.; East, Jury Packing: A Thing of the Past? 48 Mod. L. Rev. 518, 520 (1985).
"8'Note, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 227, 229 (1986) (national average in noncapital felony cases is 6 for the
prosecution and 6.8 for the defense).
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by the Constitution,2 83 continuing to permit two or three peremptory challenges would be consistent with our strong tradition of
allowing each side to have some influence over the selection of the
jury that will decide the case. It would also provide protection
against the occasional juror who is strongly biased but who is clever
enough to avoid being challenged for cause. At the same time, a
sharp reduction in the number of peremptories would make it much
more difficult for one side to remove systematically all jurors of a
certain race, religion, or ethnic background.
The advantage of legislation is its flexibility, and it is certainly
not necessary that the number of peremptory challenges be reduced
to a number that is equal. Allowing the prosecution two challenges
and the defense three, for example, would come closer to the ratios
of challenges that presently exist in Kentucky 84 and the federal
system 285 in noncapital felony cases. And maybe a sharp reduction
in the number of peremptory challenges could be made more attractive if it were coupled with expansion of the categories of challenges for cause or with some limited discretion on the part of the
trial judge to grant additional peremptories in cases where there is
a very unusual problem of possible prejudice.
A sharp reduction in the number of peremptory challenges would
certainly not cure all the problems associated with racially based
peremptory challenges. In capital cases, even if the large number
of peremptory challenges usually available-currently twenty per
side in federal court2 86-- were drastically reduced, there would still
be problems caused by racially based peremptory challenges. But
Batson is not a cure-all either. And it would seem much the wiser
course to place tight legislative limits on the number of available
peremptories in noncapital cases and let peremptories be "peremptory," rather than try to attack the problem of racially based peremptory challenges with an expensive and doubtful constitutional
remedy.
But while one hopes that Batson might spur interest in legislative
reform of the jury selection process, there are reasons to be pes28

Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1720; Swain, 380 U.S. at 212.

28See note 84 supra.
"'See Fed. R. Crim. P. 24 (b) (allowing the prosecution six peremptory challenges and
the defense ten).
'26Ibid.
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simistic about the prospects for bold legislative reforms in the area
of peremptory challenges or voir dire in general. In the first place,
jury selection is one of those areas in the twilight between substance
and procedure where courts and legislatures often share responsibility for legislative reforms, and this can produce tension between
these two branches of government. An example is the federal system
where the Supreme Court has the authority to make rules of procedure to govern trials in criminal cases, but such rules must then
be submitted to Congress, which has the power to modify or even
block implementation of such rules. 287 The result over the last fifteen
years of this relationship has not been very satisfactory as the Court
has seen many of its proposed rule changes delayed or significantly
modified by Congress. The uncertain fate that any reform would
suffer in.Congress hardly encourages bold reforms in a controversial
area like jury selection.
An additional and related reason to be pessimistic about the
prospects for legislative reform in the area of jury selection is the
fact that our trial system has created its own monster in terms of
the momentum behind voir dire and peremptory challenges. So
strong is the emphasis of the system on jury selection and voir dire
that we can expect that any proposal to cut back peremptory challenges or otherwise restrict voir dire would be bitterly fought by
trial lawyers. Since England permits no questioning of prospective
jurors during the jury selection process,2 88 the reduction in the
number of peremptory challenges in that country never had to
contend with a tradition of aggressive voir dire. But in this country
the trial bar can be expected to oppose any restrictions on voir dire.
Ten years ago, the Court felt the sting of this lobby when it proposed
a change in the federal rules pertaining to peremptory challenges,
offered partly to help eliminate the problems that gave rise to Batson,
that, among other reforms, would have reduced the number of
peremptory challenges in felony cases from six to five for prosecutors and from ten to five for defense attorneys. 289 The reform

was vigorously opposed and ultimately rejected by Congress. 2"
2 7

See 18 U.S.C. §3771.

28

S5ee Hughes, note 274 supra, at 592; Walker, note 279 supra, at 508.

2

89H.R. Doc. No. 94-464, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1976).

2

1OSee Act of July 30, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-78 section 2 (c), 91 Stat. 319. See also Note,
92 Harv. L. Rev., note 32 supra, at 1774-75.
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A more recent legislative battle over voir dire occurred in New
York in 1983, when the New York legislature had under consideration a proposal that would have placed some badly needed controls on voir dire.291 The bill would have modified the New York
practice which allows attorneys to control the questioning of jurors
and would instead have patterned voir dire on the federal model
which empowers the trial judge to conduct the voir dire with discretion to allow questioning by the attorneys.2 92 This bill was bit2 93
terly fought by the trial bar and was ultimately defeated.
The virtue of Batson is that it forces the states to confront a
problem that has been smoldering for years, but the cost is the
considerable strain that the uncertain contours of the decision place
on the system. And when the subject of the reform is a central
element of trial procedure, the piecemeal nature of constitutional
adjudication whereby the Court decides the issue of race and the
constitutionality of the prosecutor's peremptories today, but leaves
other issues, such as the applicability of equal protection to other
suspect classes or to the defense's use of peremptories, until tomorrow, is very difficult for those who must litigate now.
One way that state courts may avoid some of these uncertainties
is for state courts to take control of the issue of peremptory challenges themselves and not wait to see what the Supreme Court
does. Forced by Batson to confront the issue of discriminatory peremptory challenges, there are early indications that state courts
may simply conclude that their Sixth Amendment analogs present,
on balance, a more attractive alternative for regulating peremptory
challenges than following the Court down the uncertain path of
equal protection. In State v. Gilmore,29 4 a decision by the New Jersey
Supreme Court handed down after Batson, the court opted for the
state Sixth Amendment analog and the rationale of Wheeler as the
basis for its decision. In its opinion, the court was quite frank in
expressing its reluctance to tangle with the uncertainties of Batson.

'See text at notes 241-42 supra.
'See Editorial, Fast, Fair Ways to Pick Juries, New York Times, September 5, 1984, at
A22, col. 1; Chambers, Who Should PickJurors, Attorneys or the Judge?, New York Times,
June 13, 1984, §II, at 4, col. 3.
293
1bid.
-'103N.J. 508, 511 A.2d 1150 (N.J. 1986).
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The court emphasized that "Batson is not the final word in this
area, '29 and it quoted Justice White's prediction that " '[m]uch
litigation will be required to spell out the contours of the Court's
Equal Protection holding.' 296 More recently, Colorado has also
used its state constitutional analog to the Sixth Amendment to
297

regulate peremptory challenges.

V. THE

OPEN QUESTION: RACIALLY BASED PEREMPTORY

CHALLENGES EXERCISED BY THE DEFENSE

While Batson raised only the issue of the prosecutor's racially
based peremptory challenges, it was a mistake for the Court not to
have given some indication of where it might go on the issue of
defense challenges based on race. Judicial restraint has its virtues,
but peremptory challenges are adversary weapons: the aggressiveness with which the Court in Batson leapt to confront the issue of
racially motivated peremptory challenges on the part of the prosecution and hurried to resolve the issue on a theory not even briefed
by the parties stands in contrast to the Court's timidity on the issue
of racially motivated defense challenges. Among the majority, it is
only Justice Marshall who acknowledged the obvious: "The potential for racial prejudice inheres in the defendant's challenge as well. '' 298

No doubt the Court was worried about its ability to reach defense
peremptories under the Equal Protection Clause because there is
an initial state action problem, and, even with state action, the
initial step of the Batson analysis-that the party raising the equal
protection claim be a member of the cognizable racial group being
excluded-would have to be modified or abandoned to allow the
state to raise an equal protection claim on behalf of those being
systematically excluded. But there are a number of reasons for
thinking that it is inevitable that restrictions similar to those laid
down in Batson will be applied to defense peremptories.
In the first place, the central premise of Batson-that "public
respect for our criminal justice system and the rule of law will be
strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury
295511 A.2d at 1157.
"6Ibid., quoting from Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1725.
"'See People v. Fields,
29106 S.Ct. at 1729.

-

Colo.

-

, 732 P.2d 1145 (1987).
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service because of his race" 2 -- mandates that the Court finish the
job by assuring that public confidence is not undermined by defense
peremptories. In this regard, the Court has to be aware of the fact
that defense peremptories are a serious threat to public confidence
in the system among minority citizens.
Two of the well publicized cases involving defense peremptories
have occurred in Florida. In May of 1980, the acquittal of four
white police officers3°° who had been on trial for beating to death
a thirty-three-year-old black man who had been arrested for a traffic
violation sparked the Miami riots. 0 1 Contributing to the sense of
unfairness in the verdict in the so-called "McDuffie case" (the victim
of the beating was named McDuffie) was the fact that even though
the case was tried in Tampa, which has a sizable black population,
by coordinating their peremptories the white police officers were
able to remove every black from the venire with the result that the
jury that acquitted them was composed solely of whites. 0 2 Four
years later, the problem arose again in State v. Alvarez 303 when a
Hispanic police officer, charged with manslaughter in the death of
a young black male, was acquitted by an all-white jury.3°4 Again
05
there was broad community concern over peremptory challenges
which had permitted the defense to remove the only two blacks
remaining on the panel after challenges for cause.30 6 Against this
"Id. at 1724.
mSee State v. Diggs (No. 79-21601, Fla. Dade Co. Cir. Ct.).
30'Crewsdon, 2 Die as Blacks in Miami Protest Police Acquittals, New York Times, May
18, 1980, at 24, col. 1. Eventually 3,600 national guardsmen had to be called out to patrol

the city, and the United States Attorney General was sent by the President to Miami to
help calm the outrage felt by the black community over the acquittals. Crewsdon, Guard

Reinforced to Curb Miami Riot; 15 Dead over 3 Days, New York Times, May 20, 1980,
at 1,col. 6.
'°2Miami Times, June 23, 1983, at 1, col. . See also Andrews v. State, 438 So.2d 480,
482 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 459 So.2d 1018 (1984).

"WNo.

83-3972 (Fla. Dade Co. Cir. Ct.).

3See Jorgenson, note 9 supra, at 579-80 (1984).
0
3'
See The Challenge, Miami Herald, March 17, 1984, at 32A, col. I (calling for reexamination of the use of peremptory challenges by lawyers); Hampton, Abolish Peremptory
Challenges, Miami Herald, March 18, 1984, at 2E, col. 3 (calling for abolition of peremptory
challenges). See also Oglesby, Challenged: A Jury Of One's Peers, Miami Herald, January
26, at 29A, col. 1; Fisher, Dade Urges State To Help Keep Blacks on Juries, Miami Herald,

March 7, 1984, at 2D, col. 1. See generally, Jorgenson, note 9 supra, at 567, 579.

'0There were originally four blacks on the panel, two of whom were removed for cause
and the other two were peremptorily challenged by the defense. See Jorgenson, note 9 supra,
at 579.
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background, it is not surprising that when the Florida Supreme
Court, in Neil v. State,30 7 ruled that the use of peremptory challenges
''as a scalpel to excise a distinct racial group" violated the state
constitutional right to an impartial jury and ordered a new trial for
defendant Neil, the court was careful to explain that both the state
and the defense would be entitled in the future to challenge the
improper use of peremptory challenges. 08
Neil suggests another reason why the Court will be under tremendous pressure to extend Batson to defense peremptories: to a
certain extent the issue has already been resolved by state court
decisions like Wheeler, Soares, and Neil that have emphasized that
their restrictions on peremptories apply equally to the prosecution
and the defense. °9 While those are state constitutional decisions
under analogs to the Sixth Amendment, the conclusion of those
courts-that the state as well as the defense is entitled to an "impartial" jury-seems to dictate a similar approach under the Equal
Protection Clause. It would be difficult to explain to citizens in a
case like Alvarez, where the defendant is Hispanic but the victim
is black, that "equal" protection prohibits the prosecution from
striking Hispanics on a systematic basis, but it permits the defense
to remove all blacks on a systematic basis. In an era when our
criminal justice system has been heavily criticized for forgetting
that there are victims caught in the battle between the defendant
and the state, it would be very surprising were the Court not to
extend Batson to defense challenges aimed at removing jurors who
share a racial identity with the victim. 10° The Court may conclude

3-457 S.2d 481, 486 (Fla. 1984).
511ld. at 487.
119In United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541, 565 (5th Cir. 1986), vacated, 107 S.Ct. 1267
(1987), the Fifth Circuit observed that "every jurisdiction which has spoken to the matter,

and prohibited prosecution case-specific peremptory challenges on the basis of cognizable
group affiliation has held that the defense must likewise be so prohibited." The only exceptions appear to be the federal decisions-Batsonand McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113. The
silence of McCray on the subject of defense peremptories led one trial judge to protest that
such "inequality must lead to abolition or severe reduction of peremptories." See Roman v.
Abrams, 608 F.Supp. 629, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd, 822 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1987).
3"That the prosecution should be restricted in its use of peremptory challenges on the
basis of race, but that the defense should have no restrictions on its racially based peremptories, is certainly not without its advocates in the scholarly journals. See, e.g., Massaro,
Peremptories or Peers?-Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images, and Procedures,
64 N.C. L. Rev. 500, 560-63 (1986); Note, 92 Harv. L. Rev., note 32 supra, at 1786.

BATSON v. KENTUCKY

155

that since the interest being protected by Batson, whether asserted
by the defendant or the state, is the right of non-party citizens to
serve on juries on a nondiscriminatory basis, it is appropriate that
the state be allowed to raise that issue on behalf of those non-party
citizens.
VI. CONCLUSION

Batson is in many ways a paradigm of some of the most
serious problems that exist within the system. If one wanted to
understand how the American trial system for criminal cases came
to be the most expensive and time-consuming in the world, it would
be difficult to find a better starting point than Batson. Batson opens
up a new vista of delicate hearings and fascinating legal issues','
that will occupy courts for years to come. In starting down that
path with an opinion that gives almost no consideration to the
burden it is placing on the system, the Court in Batson seems implicitly to be conceding that trials in this country have come to have
largely a symbolic importance that dwarfs interest in trials as an
efficient and reliable mechanism for the determination of guilt or
innocence.
Besides the burdens the majority opinion places on the system,
the lack of balance in the opinion should also be a concern. To put
forward a landmark opinion on peremptory challenges that talks
glowingly about "public respect for the system" and "ensuring that
no citizen is disqualified from jury service because of his race," but
that omits any statement about racially based defense peremptories,
is startling. Presented with a golden opportunity to show some
sympathy for victims in a system frequently criticized for insensitivity in this regard, the decision to avoid any discussion of defense
peremptories results in an opinion that is one-sided and naive in
its analysis of an important adversary weapon.
To be critical of Batson is not, of course, to defend the system of
peremptory challenges or to deny that it badly needs reform. The
3'Novel issues are already arising. Recently, the Arizona Court of Appeals ruled that the
decision by the prosecution to exercise only four of its six peremptory challenges raised a
Batson issue because it had the effect of keeping off the jury the only black on the venire,
who would have been seated on the jury if the prosecution had used all six of its peremptory
challenges. State v. Scholl, Superior Court for Pima County (Bates), - Ariz. -, 743 P.2d
406 (Ct. App. 1987).
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present system of peremptory challenges seems unfair to everyone:
unfair to the defendant, unfair to the victim, and unfair to the many
citizens who are called for jury duty, often at personal inconvenience
and at financial sacrifice, but who wind up being struck by one
side or the other. But neither the courts nor the legislatures seem
very willing to lead the fight for legislative reforms of the peremptory challenge process that would try to balance fairness, efficiency,
and reliability. In the case of peremptory challenges, the legislative
vacuum results in an equal protection remedy for racially based
peremptory challenges which is laid on top of a system that has as
its operating premises arbitrariness and group discrimination.
Whether this will prove a consistent and effective remedy is doubtful.

